Changes

Among the many battles and events that took place during World War II, one of the least understood is the so-called Winter War, which took place between Finland and the Soviet Union from November 30, 1939, until March 13, 1940. The Winter War happened during the early stages of World War II and illustrated to many in the West the danger of the looming specter of totalitarianism that threatened Europe. In September of 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union, although seemingly at opposite ends of the political spectrum, had worked in concert to invade and occupy Poland.  In the months that followed, often termed by scholars as the “phony war,” Germany prepared for its eventual invasion of the Low Countries, Norway, and France, while the Soviet Union flexed its own imperial muscle by attempting to retake its former colony of Finland by force. In the war that followed the Soviet invasion of Finland, the world was awed by the tenacious fighting abilities of the Finns and the acumen of the Finnish high command. Despite being outnumbered three to one in infantry forces and many times more in terms of tanks and planes, the Finns avoided being overrun by the Soviet forces. Although not technically a victory, the Finnish resistance to the Soviet army during the Winter War allowed Finland to remain independent and to even attack the Soviet Union a year later in the “Continuation War.”

Finland and Russia have shared a border for hundreds of years and for most of that time the interaction between Finns and Russians has been relatively peaceful. For most of early modern history, Finland was a colony of Imperial Tsarist Russia. Finns were allowed to serve in the Russia military and were given full rights as Russian subjects, but the situation changed when the Russian royal family was overthrown by the Bolshevik communists in 1917. The Bolshevik hold on Russia was tenuous at best as it fought other political factions within the country as well as foreign powers during the Russian Civil War.  The Finns took advantage of the situation and declared Finland independent in 1918. Communist Russia for their part was uninterested in Finland until Josef Stalin replaced Vladimir Lenin as the supreme dictator of Russia in 1922. Stalin immediately embarked on a geo-political program that incorporated elements of imperialism into the young communist state. Russia became the core state in the newly founded Soviet Union, which turned its eyes toward what many believed was the renegade state of Finland. <ref> Channon, John. <i>The Penguin Historical Atlas of Russia.</i> (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 110-11</ref>

When the massive Red Army moved across the Finnish-Soviet international border on November 30, 1939, the Finns were waiting with a well-crafted plan for survival. At the heart of Finland’s wartime strategy was their esteemed field commander, and many would say a military genius, Carl Mannerheim. By the time the Winter War broke out, Mannerheim was already a well-seasoned military veteran who in the early part of his career served in the Imperial Russian army, so he was somewhat familiar with Russian military tactics and philosophy. But even more important than knowing his enemy, Mannerheim was a typical Nordic pragmatist who was well-suited for a campaign such as the Winter War. In the months leading up to the Winter War, Mannerheim crafted a well-thought out military strategy that combined geo-politics with practical battlefield operations.  Essentially, Mannerheim knew that tiny Finland could not defeat the Red Army outright, so he developed a strategy that was intended to inflict as many casualties on the Soviets quickly in order to either get them to the negotiating table or to entice a foreign power to join the Finns. <ref> Trotter, p. 51</ref> One of the most daring applications of this strategy was a December 23 counter-offensive by the Finns that temporarily pushed back the Soviet lines. Although the counter-offensive was ultimately unsuccessful, it kept the Soviet commanders off guard and wondering when and where the next Finnish counter-attack would take place.

The Finns hoped that ultimately their efforts to slow down the Red Army would send a signal to the world that some countries, even some the smallest, would take a stand against totalitarianism. Much of the Western press was sympathetic to the Finnish cause and when it seemed as though hostilities would break out, thousands of volunteers streamed into the Nordic nation to fight alongside the Finns on the Mannerheim Line. The major Western powers, though, remained reticent. The United Kingdom and France never declared war on the Soviet Union, even after the invasion of Poland, but a plan was developed to militarily aid the Finns in what became codenamed “Avonmouth.”  The French in particular embraced the plan enthusiastically, which was more about depriving Germany of iron-ore resources in neutral Sweden than it was about saving democratic Finland from the communist Soviet Union. Despite many in the French military openly advocating for Avonmouth, such as general Audet, the British never came on board and so the threat of foreign intervention on Finland’s behalf remained a threat, although a credible one that may have caused the Soviet high-command to make more measured moves. <ref> Cairns, John C. “Reflections on France, Britain and the Winter War Prodrome, 1939-40.” <i>Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques</i> 22 (1996) p. 212</ref>

When planning for a potential Soviet invasion months before the Winter War, Mannerheim correctly deduced that the main thrust of the Soviet attack would come north from Leningrad (St. Petersburg) into the Karelian Isthmus towards the Finnish city of Viipuri/Viborg. The Karelian Isthmus is a narrow strip of land, only about 100 miles at its widest point, between Lake Ladoga in the north and the Gulf of Finland to the south. Hundreds of lakes dot the landscape, which Mannerheim knew would prove the perfect spot for a bottleneck. Between the lakes of the Karelian Isthmus, a series of bunkers, pillboxes, trenches, and stretches of barbed wire were erected in order to slow down the Red Army. The fortifications became known collectively as the Mannerheim Line for the commander who envisioned it.  As the Finnish politicians gave their commanders plenty of freedom throughout the course of the war, the Finnish commanders did the same. Mannerheim and the Finnish high command encouraged asymmetrical warfare, which resulted in the effective use of ambushes, snipers, small patrols of “tank hunters,” and ruses such as booby traps. Perhaps the most famous guerilla method the Finnish soldiers used was throwing Molotov cocktails, named for the Soviet foreign minister at the time, to destroy Soviet tanks. <ref> Trotter, p. 42</ref> The nature of Finland’s rough terrain, along with a well thought out strategy and effective commanders were no doubt the primary reasons Finland survived the Winter War, but the Soviets sabotaged their own efforts in many ways.