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{{Mediawiki[[File:kindleoasis}}Ammunition_Hill_Museum_Exhibits_P1010035.jpeg|thumbnail|250px|left|Israeli Airstrike near the August-Victoria Hospital]]
<div class="portal" style="width{{Mediawiki:85%;">Middle Eastern History}}
Admin moved page How Did the 1967 War Shape the Middle East? to How Did the 1967 War Shape the Middle East
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Six days in June 1967 forever altered the landscape of the Middle East. Many of the modern conflicts in the region find their roots in the dramatic changes of that period. A multitude of consequences continue to shape interactions between Israelis, Palestinians, Arabs and the rest of the world. However, major political, economic, demographic and social changes took place immediately after the conflict. Specifically, political legitimacy, the occupied territories and Middle Eastern identity experienced vast transformations. Those transformations, in addition to United States involvement, would significantly impact foreign affairs for years to come.
==Background==
In early 1967, Syria and Israel had been fighting about water rights (specifically the Jordan River). As a show of pan-Arabism (a secular Arab identity), Egyptian President Gamal Nasser blocked Israeli from accessing the Red Sea for shipping. Israelis viewed this as an act of war since the entrance to the Red Sea was considered to be an international waterway. The 1967 (also known as Six-Day War) began on June 5, 1967 as Israel pre-emptively attacked Egypt’s air force. Over the next few days it destroyed 90% of the Egyptian air force while crippling Syria’s air force as well. Israeli ground troops also forced Jordanian troops out of Jerusalem. On June 7, a ceasefire was declared.<ref>James Gelvin, <i>[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/019021886X/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=019021886X&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=a348102b182443dc162caeeffedfb623 The Modern Middle East: A History ]</i> (Oxford University Press, 2008), 273</ref>
==Political Changes==
[[File:Menachem_Begin_1978.jpg|275px|left|thumbnail|Menachem Begin]]Politics and political legitimacy following the 1967 War resulted in completely different outcomes for Israelis and Arabs in the region. Israel arguably achieved some level of political legitimacy through massive land acquisition and bargaining power over neighboring Arab states. Israel gained all of Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights in only six days.<ref>Gelvin, 273</ref> The Israeli government announced a bargaining deal with Arabs involving the exchange of land for peace. To address the issue of land ownership immediately following the conflict, the United Nations Security Council put forth Resolution 242 which specified the inadmissibility of gaining territory through war.<ref>U.N. Security Council: Resolution 242, as quoted in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (ed) The Israel-Arab Reader (Penguin, 2001), 116</ref> However, Israel used the occupied territories as bargaining chips. For example, Israel negotiated for peace with Egypt in 1978 following of years of conflict that began with the 1973 October War. While this was a victory for Israel and its land for peace equation, Egypt was given the Sinai Peninsula. But discussion about the Palestinian refugee crisis was not addressed.<ref>Article II of the Egypt and Israel Peace Treaty, as quoted in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (ed) The Israel-Arab Reader (Penguin, 2001), 228</ref> While the treaty points out Israel’s compliance with Resolution 242, it fails to acknowledge the conditions of the resolution that Israel did not follow, such as settling the refugee problem within the occupied territories. With massive land gains and political and military advantages, Israel found itself in a position to take bolder steps in obtaining and securing land. In a controversial move, Israel named Jerusalem as the country’s everlasting capital as part of an era of new assertiveness that lasted well into the 1980s (with Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s government.<ref>Gelvin, 275</ref><ref>Dov Waxman, The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of Israeli Identity: Defending/Defining the Nation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 52</ref>
Although the 1967 War is sometimes seen as a struggle between Israelis and Palestinians, all neighboring Arab states were greatly affected by the unstable political environment. Jordan lost control of the West Bank and Syria relinquished control of the Golan Heights.<ref>Gelvin, 273</ref> The loss of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, and, more importantly, President Nasser’s loss of political credibility were particularly detrimental to Egypt. No longer did Nasser’s dream of pan-Arabism seem possible after such a concerted failure by Arab states to defend Palestinians. It was in the atmosphere of failed pan-Arabism that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) gained a stronger foothold under their leader, Yasir Arafat. Formed in 1964, the PLO was created around the idea that Palestinians should be self-reliant in their efforts to regain a Palestinian state.<ref>Gelvin, 277</ref> This guiding tenet removed not only the expectations for Arab financial and military aid, but had the effect of weakening an already diminished Arab authority.
==Changes to Identity==
These changes in politics and geography altered not only Israeli and Palestinian identity, but reversed the advances of pan-Arabism. After Nasser’s self-perceived failure, he briefly resigned from the presidency. However, he still clung to the ideals of pan-Arabism when calling for a united Arab response to remove Israeli aggression.<ref>Nasser’s resignation broadcast, as quoted in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (ed) The Israel-Arab Reader (Penguin, 2001), 104</ref> He specifically mentioned the United Arab Republic, comprised of Syria and Egypt. It is surprising that he would mention a republic that had only lasted three years before disunity broke it apart. This disenchantment with an Arab state would continue after the war as many Arabs questioned the success of an Arab state following such an overwhelming defeat by a non-Arab and non-Islamic people.
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Trouble among Middle Eastern nations only continued after 1967. In 1970, Jordan and Syria began a conflict with each other which resulted in an Arab Summit mediated by Nasser.<ref>Bassil A. Mardelli, Middle East Perspectives: From Lebanon (1968–1988) (iUniverse, 2012), 133</ref> The major issue on the table was how Arab states needed to live and work together in a world radically changed by the 1967 War. Interestingly, at this time Nasser had been changing his policies of non-alignment and pan-Arabism probably to suit the growing Arab crisis. The self-scrutiny of Nasser and the Arab states created support for Islamization, identity and government based on the religion of Islam rather than pan-Arabism, a more secular identity which strove for a single Arab state.
==International Involvement==
[[File:President_Nasser's_visit_to_the_Suez_front_with_Egypt's_top_military_commanders_during_the_War_of_Attrition.jpg|thumbnail|left|275px|President Nasser visting Suez Front during the War of Attrition.]]
The U.S. would continue to play a large role in the region whether it liked it or not. Historian James Gelvin argues that the Egyptian War of Attrition (1969) against Israel specifically sought to re-engage the U.S. in the affairs of the Middle East.<ref>Gelvin, 275</ref> The War of Attrition destroyed the Suez Canal over the period of 1969-1970 and did lead to another response by the U.S. The U.S. Rogers Plan proposed by the Secretary of State ended the War of Attrition in 1970. This meant that all parties accepted the ninety-day ceasefire set forth in the plan. However, tensions between Israel and her neighbors did not relax even after international involvement. In fact, Yasir Arafat stated, “We consider Israel as playing the new role of the East India Company in the Middle East.”<ref>Yasir Arafat interview 1969, as quoted in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (ed) The Israel-Arab Reader (Penguin, 2001), 139</ref> This attitude suggests that increased Western involvement only led to suspicion and a renewed sense of imperial involvement.
[[Category:Military History]] [[Category:20th Century History]] [[Category:Middle East History]]