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[[File: Kursk 1.jpg|thumbnail|300px250px|left|German troops fighting at Kursk in 1943]]
The Battle of Kursk took place in July 1943 and was one of the largest and most important battles fought on the Eastern Front during World War II. Kursk was the largest tank battle in history, and it was the last attempt by the German army to slow down the Soviet Military. Kursk was the last throw of the dice for Germany on the Eastern Front. The failure of the German offensive at Kursk dealt a severe blow to the army. After the battle, Germany adopted a defensive posture on the Eastern Front. Why did Germany fail to achieve their objectives at the Battle of Kursk?
====Why Kursk?====
[[File: Kursk 2.jpg|thumbnail|275px255px|left|German infantry at Kursk]]
A successful German offensive would have greatly improved Germany’s strategic position on the Eastern Front. The Germans believed that the Soviet leadership had become increasingly disenchanted with their western Allies<ref> George, p. 167</ref>. Despite constant demands, the British and the Americans had failed to open a ‘second front’ in western Europe. If the German forces inflicted a devastating defeat on Stalin’s armies, the Soviets would be more likely to enter into peace negotiations with the Germans and end their alliance with Britain and the United States. This could have allowed the Germans to keep many of their gains in the east and concentrate on their war with the western allies. Despite the recent setbacks on the Eastern Front and in North Africa, Germany remained confident that they could turn the tide of war back in their favor. The Germans believed that their army was better armed in 1943 than at any other time. Hitler had appointed Albert Speer as head of the armaments industry, and he had dramatically increased production.
====German failures before the Battle====
[[File:Kursk Soviet machineguns.jpg|thumbnail|275px255px|left|Soviet Soldiers at Kursk]]
Hitler decreed that “there must be no failure” during Operation Citadel. After Stalingrad's intelligence failures, the German High Command collected all the intelligence that they could get. Reconnaissance planes photographed all the defensive systems that the Soviets had established in the Kursk and Oriel bulge. Despite the vast efforts spent on this intelligence gathering information, the Germans failed to establish the area's Russian forces' size. Even though the Germans had acquired a great deal of information, they misinterpreted it.<ref> Barbier, p. 113</ref> This misled the Germans into overestimating their chances of success in the coming offensive.