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[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1981-070-15, Frankreich, Panzer IV.jpg|300px|left|thumbnail|Panzer IV in France 1940]]
During World War Two, Germany used Blitzkrieg warfare or "Lightning War" to quickly sweep through Europe. Poland, Norway, France, the Low Countries, the Balkans, North Africa, and the Soviet Union were quickly overwhelmed, and Germany's victories were incredibly fast and efficient. France's famed Maginot Line proved utterly useless in the face of Germany's new approach to mechanized warfare.
Remarkably, instead of inventing a new type of warfare, Hans von Seeckt (Commander of the Reichswehr from 1920-1926) used traditional German/Prussia warfare tactics but updated them for armored/mechanized infantry and airpower to create Blitzkrieg. Hans von Seeckt was both the architect of the German Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg tactics used so successfully in World War Two. These victories were so stunning that they gave rise to the myth of German military supremacy—a myth that has persisted to this day.
====Defining How is Blitzkrieg or "Lightning War"==defined?==
The early German successes have long been closely associated with the catch-all (and catchy) blitzkrieg term—the “lightning war.” What was blitzkrieg? John Keegan’s definition of it is fairly representative of the popular conception of the German war-making style:
<blockquote>“[Blitzkrieg was] essentially a doctrine of attack on a narrow front by concentrated armor, trained to drive forward through the gap it forced without concern for its flanks…"<ref>Keegan, John, ''The Mask of Command''. USA: Penguin Books, p. 259.</ref></blockquote>
The historical reality was somewhat more complicated. While the German military was indeed concerned with speed and maneuver in warfare, it is probably not true that their fighting style was either doctrinaire or even new. First, a formal and established doctrine of blitzkrieg probably did not exist in the German military. The term “blitzkrieg” appeared only rarely in official Wehrmacht literature before or during the war, and the term seems to have much more popular with foreign journalists.<ref>Friesser, Karl-Heinz, ''The Blitzkrieg Legend''. Trans. John T. Greenwood. USA: Naval Institute Press, 2005, pp. 4-5.</ref> Second, the tactics of maneuver and speed in warfare were not an interwar discovery by the Germans but were a reversion to traditional German/Prussian war styles.
====The What was the German Way of War==?==
Robert Citino has been the most responsible for theorizing the existence of a “German Way of War.”<ref> This was drawn from Robert M. Citino, ''The German Way of War''. USA: University of Kansas Press, 2005.</ref> According to Citino, the origins of Germany’s military-style came out of the particular strategic position of Germany’s founding state: the Kingdom of Prussia. From the days of Frederick William, the Prussians have had to contend with enemies who both came from all sides because of Prussia’s central location, but who were also better endowed with workforce and economic resources. Prussia could not afford to fight long, protracted wars against such enemies—it simply did not have the resources or staying power to do so. The need for “short and lively” wars, compounded by a lack of strategic depth, meant that the Prussians tended to attack even if they were not the ones who initiated the conflict. The Prussian warfare style emphasized maneuvering to find the enemy flank or rear and then surrounding the enemy, thereby creating a Kessel or “cauldron.”
When the Hohenzollern monarch became the Kaiser of Germany, the Prussian Way of War became the German Way of War. The Prussian General Staff became the main conduit for this tradition, and it continued to advocate “short and lively wars.” This military weltanschauung persisted even though Germany rapidly became one of the most industrialized and populated countries in Europe during the 19th century and was thus more capable of winning long, attritional wars.
World War I seemed to nullify bewegungskrieg when both sides were unable to maneuver in the face of the defense's superiority. Unfortunately, almost all of the major combatants of the First World War initially favored aggression and attack—the so-called “cult of the offensive.” <ref>Jack Snyder, ''The Ideology of the Offensive''. USA: Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 41-106.</ref> So in the opening months of the war, all of the major combatants launched massive attacks that all bloodily failed. Why was the Western Front locked in a stalemate for almost four years?
First, firepower in machine guns, bolt-action rifles, and—especially—quick-firing artillery like the French 75mm or the British 18-pounder favored the defensive over the offensive. The new weapons technology had made the attack difficult and costly, almost to the point of futility. “Crossing the deadly ground” or attacking across terrain covered by these new weapons extracted a huge toll on exposed attackers, who also could not stop to fire without disrupting the momentum of the advance.<ref>The term is from Perry D. Jamieson, ''Crossing the Deadly Ground''. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1994.</ref> Conversely, defenders sheltering in even improvised field fortifications presented much less of a target to the attackers’ firepower and were far less vulnerable.
[[File: German trenches on the aisne.jpg|thumbnail|left|German Trenches on the Aisne]]
It is something of a myth that the period's militaries were unaware of the dangers posed by modern firepower. <ref>Howard Bailes, “Technology and Tactics in the British Army, 1866-1900,” pp. 21-47. From Men, Machines, and War, eds. Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1988; Jamieson, ''Crossing the Deadly Ground''; Robert Citino, ''Quest for Decisive Victory''. USA: University Press of Kansas, 2002, pp. 31-132.</ref> There were some attempts to develop tactics to overcome the dangers of defensive fire, and some of the combatants had alternatives to massed attacks in close order.<ref>With the notable exception of the French. See Robert A. Doughty, ''Pyrrhic Victory''. USA and UK: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.</ref> The problem was that these solutions were not enough, and attacks still suffered horrendously even when successful. Tactical attacks did not necessarily fail in the sense that they were unable to reach trench lines—attacking lines. The attacking infantry often actually did reach the enemy trenches despite all of the defensive firepower. The problem lay in consolidating and reinforcing success and thereby turning a tactical success into an operational one.
The defensive advantage was technological, and it was conferred by new means of transport and communication. During World War I, the transport was still primarily muscle-powered. That is, soldiers, ordnance, and supplies were either leg-borne or conveyed by animal power. Strategic mechanized transport over land , i.e. motor vehicles, overland was through railways. Unfortunately, and railways were not responsive to rapidly changing tactical situations. Thus, if If an infantry attack breached a trench line, the defender could not use the transport network to bring up reinforcements to plug the gap quickly. Indeed, the significant combatants built rail lines behind their trench systems precisely to ease such transport. Attackers could not match this kind of ease of transport because their railway lines ended at the no-man’s land between the two trench lines. To compound the attacker’s problems, the mud in no man’s land—often churned up by constant bombardment—was difficult to traverse and usually targeted by enemy interdicting fire. Under such conditions, the resupply and reinforcement of a successful breach were almost impossible.Because the attacks were not able to use motor vehicles to speed across no-man's land, it is was difficult to get enough troops to seize their opponent's trenches. Hand in hand with the transport problem was the problem of communications—more specifically, the attacker’s lack thereof.<ref>Paul Gannon, “WW1: First World War communications and the 'Tele-net of Things.'” http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2014/06/links-for-victory.cfm, retrieved on 25 Sept. 2015.</ref> Long-distance communications were generally done through telegraphy, a system that was not very portable. Wireless telegraphy did exist, but the early sets were bulky, unreliable, and of short-range. The most commonly used form of telegraphy during the First World War relied on wires to transmit information. These wires were easier to lay in times of peace, when the grid’s layout could be properly plotted and when the wires could be buried underground. During an attack, the only way for the attackers to stay in telegraphic communication with their rear was to trail the wire behind them as they crossed no man's land. This made for a very vulnerable line, one that was easily cut or disrupted. It was, therefore, difficult for a successful attack to request support from the rear. Indeed, for most of the war, the only reliable means of doing so was through runners—the most famous of whom must have been Corporal Adolf Hitler. <ref>Keegan, ''Mask of Command'', pp. 241-243 and pp. 251-252.</ref>
The second major dilemma was the very nature of the armies of Europe before World War I. These armies were massive, the product of what John Keegan called a “military population explosion” brought about my nationalism and the advocacy of the “nation at arms.” <ref>Keegan, ''Mask of Command'', p. 244.</ref> These armies were composed largely of conscripts or reservists who were not in the best training. There were a few highly trained regulars, but most of the soldiers did not possess the high standard of training required to overcome the challenges of modern warfare. These conscript armies lacked finesse—they were too large to command with the technology of the day, and they lacked the training to be supple. According to the post-war German Army commander, Hans von Seeckt, these armies could only move forward ponderously and crush the enemy through sheer mass. <ref>Citino, ''The German Way of War'', p. 243.</ref> The problem of poor training grew worse as the war consumed the trained reserves of manpower. By the latter half of the war, tactics had become even more simplistic almost by default—it was all that the poorly-prepared soldiers were capable of. <ref>John Keegan, ''The Face of Battle''. USA: Penguin Books, 1976, pp. 229-230.</ref>
By the end of the war, a degree of mobility was restored to the battlefield. It was not perfect mobility since the problems of sustaining an attack remained, and but logistics and communications problems still constrained operational freedom. But the The fact remains that it was possible to overcome the trenches' challenge, and all of the significant combatants came up with ways of doing so.
A non-technological solution was infiltration tactics: infantry would sneak up to the enemy line's weakest point, attack them from the flanks or rear, often after a brief bombardment, and then push on, bypassing points of resistance. These tactics are erroneously thought to have originated with the Germans. Still, the British and the French came up with them independently—possibly even before the wide-scale German usage of them in the 1918 Spring Offensives.<ref>Jonathan Krause, ''Early Trench Tactics in the French Army''. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013; Paddy Griffith, ''Battle Tactics of the Western Front''. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994.</ref>
Therefore, the German experience of World War I was quite different from that of the French and the British, and the “lessons” they drew from it were consequently also different. They were not as wedded to the idea of stalemate or the irrelevance of the offensive and operational maneuver. They chose to view the Stellungskrieg of the trenches as an aberration that could be overcome. In the German view, ''Bewegungskrieg'' had not been rendered obsolete or untenable—it just had to be adapted to the new circumstances.
====How did Hans von Seeckt develops develop Blitzkrieg Tactics & Strategy==Strategies?==
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====Development What type of New Technologies and the created a Mechanized German Army==?==
Mechanization was relatively slow to come to the German army, in part because of the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and because of simple poverty. Von Seeckt himself was a traditionalist and believed that exploitation of a breakthrough was a task for cavalry. Like most other militaries, the Reichswehr initially conceived of tanks as infantry support weapons—which was logical given the unreliability, slow speed, and short operational range of early tanks.<ref>Richard Ogorkiewicz, Armored Forces. New York: Acro Publishing Company. 1970, p. 13.</ref>
Unlike the British armor theorist J. F. C. Fuller, the Germans knew that tanks needed the support of artillery, infantry, and air power to overcome enemy defenses. Instead of advocating for an all-tank army in the same way that Fuller did, the Germans created the panzer division. This was an all-arms force whose main power came from tanks, which was heavily supported by infantry, artillery, and the logistical support mounted in trucks or other tracked or semi-tracked vehicles. Motorizing or mechanizing these supporting branches gave them the mobility to keep up with the tanks, especially during long operational maneuvers. <ref>Citino, ''The German Way of War'', p. 241 and pp. 253-255.</ref>
The Germans also focused on the radio—a technology which that promised to solve the problem of communications. Radio was wireless, which meant that individual units no longer had to rely on vulnerable telegraphs or telephones. Now commanders could keep in close touch with their forward forces, and it was easier to reinforce success or mitigate failure. The Germans equipped almost all of their tanks with radios and widely distributed them to their units. Just as important as their practice maneuvers with tanks and infantry were their interwar radio exercises to test their communications procedures.<ref>Citino, ''The German Way of War'', pp. 255-256.</ref>
The Germans' problems during their mechanization drive were not negligible and had an impact on their armor doctrine. The biggest problem they faced was that the German industry could not produce the desired numbers of tanks, trucks, and transporters.<ref>Richard L. DiNardo, ''Germany’s Panzer Arm in World War II''. USA: Stackpole Books, 2006.</ref> German industry still failed even when Adolf Hitler came to power and prioritized military procurement—and nearly destroyed the Third Reich economy in the process.<ref>Richard Overy, ''War and the Economy in the Third Reich''. UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 183-204.</ref>
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====The What Role of did Airpower and the Luftwaffe play in German Blitzkrieg==?==
The air arm was a crucial component of Germany’s success in World War II, and its development during the interwar period should also be mentioned. The Luftwaffe has usually been thought of as an adjunct to the Heer, or ground forces, of Germany and not as invested in the strategic bombing fervor that gripped Britain and America.<ref>Robert Doughty, “Myth of Blitzkrieg,” from Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically. USA: US Army War College, 1998, p. 62; Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat. USA: Air University Press, 1993, p. 1.</ref> This is a simplification since some commanders in the fledgling Luftwaffe (in the 1930s) wanted to create a strategic bombing force along the lines advocated by such theorists Guilio Douhet.<ref>John Buckley, ''Air Power in the Age of Total War''. UK: UCL Press, 1999m pp. 74-77.</ref>
The result was a balanced air force of tremendous utility. The Luftwaffe could win air superiority, conduct various bombing missions, transport supplies or men, and perform surveillance-- all with high proficiency. Somewhat ironically, given its current reputation, the Luftwaffe was at its weakest in the close air support role.<ref>Murray and Millett, ''A War to be Won'', p. 34; Buckley, ''Air Power in the Age of Total War'', pp. 85-86.</ref>
It must finally be mentioned that political and social factors come into play as well. The German armed forces were united with the Nazis to rebuild military power and embark on wars to restore German position. This position was widely accepted, and unlike countries like France or Britain, Germans were not anti-war.
The German way of war was not perfect, and the test of war would show up its weaknesses in strategy, logistics, and intelligence. But in 1939, on the eve of war, it had a system of war that was had the advantages of efficiency and surprise. France, England, Poland, Russia, and many other countries would learn how well the Prussians had adapted their Bewegungskrieg to the new war conditions.
Updated May 4February 2nd, 20192021.
====References====