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Crucially Montgomery, failed to understand the terrain that he expected his men to fight in. The roads in the Netherlands were narrow and that the ground around them was unsuitable for armor. This was a fundamental error- Montgomery had simply assumed that his tanks could make their way rapidly to the landing zones, by using only the roads. During the battle, the roads became death traps for many British units and they soon became clogged with burned out tanks and vehicles and this critically delayed the ground forces coming to the support of the paratroopers in Arnhem, in particular. Perhaps the biggest failing of the Montgomery plan was that it assumed that the Germans had been decisively beaten and that any counter-attack that they could launch in the area would be limited.<ref>Montgomery, p. 178</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-J27784,_Arnheim,_Walter_Model,_Heinz_Harmel.jpg|thumbnail|225px|General Walter Model with SS-Brigadeführer Heinz Harmel]] The Germans had been driven back some two hundred miles in a matter of weeks. The British and the Americans dominated the skies and constantly harassed the Germans. The roads had become very unsafe for the Germans and they had also come under attack from the local resistance movements. The Germans had lost some 90,000 killed or wounded during the summer of 1944 and a further 200,000 had been taken prisoner or missing in action.<ref> Ryan, p. 1, 45</ref> However, after the failure of the British army to encircle the German army in the Scheldt Estuary allowed the Germans time to regroup in the Netherlands. The German front had begun to stabilize. They were also ably led by the very experienced General Walter Model. He also received some reinforcements in the form of the remaining units of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. Unfortunately, for the Allies, especially the British, the SS units were positioned in Arnhem. This was not merely bad luck, but due to good German intelligence.<ref>Hastings, p. 119</ref>