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In the aftermath of the Persian Wars, the two powers could not come to an agreement on their respective spheres of influence and this led to friction and eventually outright war. Athens and its ambitions also led to increasing instability and this is exemplified in the Megarian Decree. The profoundly different societies of Athens and Sparta was also a significant factor in the war’s outbreak, which also had an ideological aspect.

[[File: PEP THREE.jpg|thumbnail|left|300px|Statuette of a Spartan Warrior]]

The origins of the Peloponnesian War lay in the Greeks victory over the Persians. The Greeks had combined under the leadership of Sparta and Athens to defeat the Persians, then the most powerful empire in Asia. In the aftermath of the Persian Wars, the Greeks were unable to maintain their unity. The Greek world was riven by cultural and ethnic differences and people’s first loyalty was to their Polis or local city or community. There was a definite sense of ‘Greekness’ and a common cultural heritage.<ref>Kagan, Donald. <i>[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0801495563/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0801495563&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=a72c6923cec3d4d8a05a33168424d78d The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War]</i> (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 56</ref> Yet this was not enough to overcome deep divisions in the Greek world and as soon as the Persians left they immediately began to fall out amongst themselves. Sparta a very conservative society had opted out of the war with Persia once their invasion had been defeated. Athens continued the war against Persia and it formed the Delian League. This League was an alliance of city-states and islands that vowed to continue the war against the Persians.<ref>Kagan, p. 113</ref>

Athens growing ambitions led to tensions with its neighbors and eventually this led to a war. This involved Athens and Corinth, with the latter receiving some support from Sparta. This conflict ended with a peace treaty and a ‘Thirty Years Peace’, This in theory guaranteed Athens and Sparta their respective spheres of influence. Corinth and other members of the Peloponnesian League were unhappy about Sparta’s lack of leadership. Some leading Sparta became concerned that inaction would push the other major Greek powers, to side with Athens. During the so-called thirty Year Peace Athens grew ever stronger and in many ways arrogant, as seen in its increasing haughty attitude to its subject city-states.

The underlying cause of the war was the rapid rise of the Athenians. They had grown from just another city-state to an Empire. During and after the Persian Wars, it had transformed itself and became a major trading and maritime power.<ref>Cawkwell, George. <i>[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B000FA5ZGY/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=B000FA5ZGY&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=b0d12599fc35ad97a1a071a79c90ab5e Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War]</i> (London: Routledge, 1997), p 67</ref> It had developed into the greatest maritime power in the Greek world and had the ability to dominate the trade routes in the eastern Mediterranean. It had emerged as a great Empire in a very quick period of time and this upset the traditional balance of power. For many decades’ Sparta, had been the greatest power in Greece, this was based on its well-disciplined and much-feared army. The Spartan Hoplite were considered the best soldiers in the Greek world.<ref>Hanson, Victor Davis. <i>[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0812969707/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0812969707&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=2988ca75b4a6858afae8101e8c5ce3d0 A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War]</i>. (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 56</ref>

The belief that Spartan fear of Athens was the ultimate cause of the war was the view of Thucydides. According to, the great Greek historian, Thucydides the growth of the ‘power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon (Sparta), made war inevitable.<ref>Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> 1.67–71</ref> "He believed that the Peloponnesian War was inevitable, because when a rising power confronted another power, they would inevitably wage a war against each other to further or protect their interests<ref>Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> 1.67–71 </ref>. Some later historians have also argued that war was inevitable between the two greatest Greek powers. It is still widely held that in international relations, the growth of a nation-state or empire will inevitably lead to rivalry and war with an established power.<ref>Kagan, p. 71 </ref>

The Spartans and the Athenians were very different societies. Athens was a democracy, and it was very individualistic. The population played a very important role in politics and indeed it was a radical democracy. The citizens, (only free males) could directly vote on the affairs of the city. Sparta was almost the opposite of Athens in every way. It was a very stratified and conservative society. It was ostensibly ruled by two kings, from two royal families.<ref>Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> 1.67–71 </ref> The kings shared power with a council of elders (Gerousia). Sparta society depended on a servile population the helots who toiled the lands of Lacodemia for their Spartan masters.<ref>Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> 1.67–71 </ref> Sparta was a highly military society and the need for a strong and well-disciplined army was the main concern of the state. The state took boys from their family and trained them from youth to be soldiers. The role of women was to produce good soldiers and men were expected to be brave warriors.

The profound cultural and political differences between the two great Greek powers contributed to the war. They had real difficulties understanding each other and this lead to mutual suspicions. Because of their different political systems and cultures they were often ideologically opposed. Sparta favored the many oligarchies and distrusted the role of the common people in government. In contrast, Athens encouraged democracy and believed that it was the best form of government.<ref>Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> 1.67–71</ref> This ideological rivalry between Sparta and Athens did much to increase tensions in the run up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and was a contributing factor.

[[File:PEP FOUR.jpg|thumbnail|300px|left|Vase showing an Athenian ship, a Trireme]]

The tensions between the Athenians and the Greek only grew. Thucydides noted that many believed that war was only a matter of time and that the Thirty Years Peace Treaty would soon be broken. There was a crisis when a Greek colony in Thrace that was in dispute with Athens asked the Spartans for assistance. Athens despite this laid siege to the colony. The Athenians, at this time were also in dispute with the small city-state of Megara and they unilaterally banned the ships of that city from its port and its allies. This became known as the Megarian Decree. Megara was a long-time Spartan ally and this was widely resented, as it was seen as an attempt to make Megara completely dependent on Athens.<ref>Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> 1.71-73 </ref> This was not acceptable to Sparta and they believed that if Megara came within the orbit of the Athenians that they would use the port to weaken their position in Greece.

The Athenians were extremely confident and they knew that as long as they had their navy and their ‘Long Walls’ that they could not be defeated even if they could not beat Sparta and her allies on the battlefield. This strategy was recommended by Pericles to the Athenians and was much praised by Thucydides. Sparta began to contemplate war but they seemed unwilling to formally declare war. Then the situation spun out of control when allies of Sparta attacked the allies of Athens. The Spartans came to believe that they had no choice but to go to war. In 431 BCE, the senior Spartan king led an army into the countryside around Athens and laid it waste. This was the start of the great Peloponnesian War. The early years of the war were a stalemate because according to Thucydides writings, this was because the Athenians followed Pericles cautious strategy.<ref>Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.69–71</ref> Later Athens, encouraged by Alcibiades launched the Sicilian expedition to conquer Sicily during a lull in the fighting, known as the Peace of Nicias. This proved to be a disaster and it led to the loss of an Athenian army and navy. Remarkably, the Athenians continued to fight and the Spartans needed Persian help to defeat them.<ref>Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> 6.6–11</ref> The destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami ended the war, and Athens surrendered the following year. Athens was forced to tear down its Long Walls and was fortunate not to be utterly destroyed.

The Peloponnesian War changed Greece in every way. Nothing was the same after the war and Athens was never to be as powerful. The causes of the war, are that the Athenian Empire upset the balance of power in the Greek world. This greatly alarmed Sparta and its allies. The aggressive policies of Athens did not help the situation- the ambitions of the city-state certainly provoked the Spartans. Increasingly, the Spartans became very nervous about the growing naval and commercial power of Athens. At first, they resisted the calls of its allied to declare war on its arch-rival. Once Athens had issued the Megarian degree, it initiated a chain of event that led to the Spartan invasion of Athenian territory. The deep cultural differences between the two Greek powers was also a contributory factor to the increasing tensions that later exploded into an all-out war that consumed the entire Greek world.

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*[[How did Athens become the leading Greek city-state?]]

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