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France was bitterly divided between the left and the right. This lack of unity in France was crippling at a crucial juncture in the war. The division also extended to the relationships between the military and political leadership of France. The French Generals were rights wing and distrusted the left wing politicians who ran France. French ministers also did not trust the judgement of their generals. The French officer corps was more worried about a Communist revolution than a German invasion. For example, General Weygand was more concerned with maintaining social stability in the wake of the German invasion than actually fighting the Germans. Many later accused some French Generals of being traitors. Perhaps the greatest weakness in the French leadership was that they did not have a true war leader, as one Frenchman stated in 1942, they ‘had no Churchill’. If France had a leader of the calibre of Clemenceau in 1940, perhaps the outcome of the Battle of France could have been different. <ref> Why Did the French Army Collapse So Quickly? – <i>Omnibooks Magazine</i>, (London July, 1942), p. 6</ref>
===Defeatism in France===France was a powerful country with a large army and a vast Empire that stretched around the globe, but it was not cohesive. It had stark political conflicts and many politicians were more loyal to their political party than their country. People on both the extreme Left such as the Communists or the extreme right hated the French government so virulently, their support of the French government be best described as half-hearted after the German invasion. Many ordinary people were disgusted with the leaders of the Third Republic, who were widely seen as professional politicians who were both venal and corrupt.<ref>Jackson, p.117</ref> Furthermore, defeatism was rampant at the start of WW II. France had a low birth rate and many were convinced that the country was degenerating, based on ideas current at the time. <ref> Bloch, Marc, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0393319113/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0393319113&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=b9916b35c01e23b2ac59f9ebb5e33d42 Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940]'' (New York, NY: Norton, 1946), p. 117</ref> The cultural pessimism in France meant that many, in the political and military elite believed that France could not defeat Germany and that any efforts to resist the Germans were pointless. Many people believed that France was a nation in decline and that her greatest days had passed. This led to a spirit of defeatism in France in the Spring and Summer of 1940, that played an important role in the Fall of France. Despite the valiant efforts of many French men against the German invasion, the French government and military were ill-equipped both politically and militarily to meaningfully contest Germany. <ref>Copper, p, 144</ref>.
==Conclusion==
