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Why was France defeated in 1940

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[[File:French Prisoners 1940.jpg|thumbnail|300px|left|French Prisoners,1940]]
In September 1939, the Nazi war machine invaded Poland and World War II began. The fall of France and its Britain declared against Nazi Germany in 1939. The French army 1940 was in theory as strong as the Germany's. It had a vast Empire sudden and a sophisticated arms industryshocking. It French leaders believed that they had also established prepared for a series of fortifications along the eastern border of the country along potential war with Germany, known as the Maginot Lineand were well prepared. The Line was designed to keep German forces out of France. InitiallyTragically, France and Great Britain appeared to be a match for Germanythey were not. However,in a period Within months of weeks in the late spring and early summer of 1940German invasion, it became clear that that France was woefully unprepared for the German onslaughtcollapsed. Why did France suffered a humiliating defeat and was surrender so quickly occupied by Nazi Germany. ? Its failure was a result of a hopelessly divided French political elite, a paucity of quality military leadership, rudimentary French military tactics. On the battlefield France faced a vastly more prepared German army that utilized both more advanced weapons and sophisticated tactics. It was a mismatch.
In September 1939, the German war machine invaded Poland, and World War II began. France and Britain declared against Germany in 1939. The French army was in theory as strong as Germany's. It had a vast Empire and a sophisticated arms industry. It had also established a series of fortifications along the country's eastern border along with Germany, known as the Maginot Line. The Line was designed to keep German forces out of France. Initially, France and Great Britain appeared to be a match for Germany.  However, in weeks in the late spring and early summer of 1940, it became clear that France was woefully unprepared for the German onslaught. France suffered a humiliating defeat and was quickly occupied by Germany. Its failure was a result of a hopelessly divided French political elite, a lack of quality military leadership, rudimentary French military tactics. On the battlefield, France faced a vastly more prepared German army that utilized both more advanced weapons and sophisticated tactics. It was a mismatch. ===Background=What happened to France after World War One? ==
[[File:Stuka file.jpg|thumbnail|300px|left|Stuka dive bomber, 1940]]
France had been fearful of Germany ever since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. In this war, the Prussians had quickly defeated the French and occupied much of the country. In World War I, The Germans had come very close to defeating the French , and without allied assistance , the country would have lost to Germany. Despite being among the victors in World War One , the French still dreaded a conflict with Germany. During the Versailles treaty negotiations after the collapse of Germany during World War, French negotiators were adamant Germany's military had to be neutralized.  The French initially , led by Prime Minister Clemenceau, adopted a hard line towards the Germans in 1918-1919. There was a thaw in the Franco-German relationship in the mid-1920s , and there was the hope of a genuine rapprochement between the two greatest largest powers in continental Europe.  However, the Great Depression and the rise of Hitler meant that the French were suddenly faced with a potentially aggressive regime in Germany. The French adopted a diplomatic policy of appeasement and sought to placate Hitler by offering him concessions, such as allowing him to re-militarize the Rhineland. The French Still, France took no chances and began to prepare their defenses.
[[File:Hochwald_historic_photo.jpg|thumbnail|300px|left|Anti-tank turret at the Ouvrage Hochwald fortification on the Maginot Line in 1940]]
The French devoted a huge considerable amount of resources and capitial capital to the construction of the Maginot Line. This defensive line was named after a French Defence Minister. The French constructed a long line of fortifications along their eastern border with German. It stopped at the Belgian border. The French stationed all their forces behind the Maginot Line and adopted a defensive posture. In September 1939, the French with the British declared war on Germany after Hitler invaded Poland. For several months, there was little or no activity on the Western Front. This period was known as the ‘Phoney War’. However, in the Spring of 1940, the Germans shifted their attention west and went on the offensive.
The Battle of == When Did Germany Invade France lasted only 46 days? ==In September 1939, from the German invasion on French with the 10th of May to the surrender of France British declared war on the 25th of June 1940Germany after Hitler invaded Poland. Paris fell to the Germans on the 14th of JuneFor several months, after the virtual collapse of the French Army. French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud resigned there was little or no activity on the 16 June during the catasptropheWestern Front. His successor, Marshal Philippe Pétain, began negotiations to end This period was known as the war'Phoney War. The German army approximately suffered 157' However,000 casualties in the invasion Spring of France. The Allies lost over twice as many men1940, with 360,000 casulaties. A further two million were captured. Some 300,000 British the Germans shifted their attention west and French troops escaped went on the Germans after being evacuated by naval forces at Dunkirkoffensive. The Germans occupied the majority of France. In the south of France, the Vichy Regime established a semi-autonomous political entity. Vichy maintained control over the majority of the French Colonies. <ref>Bond, Brian, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0080377009/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0080377009&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=8c2293a2e966ba28b14946a14239a02d Britain, France and Belgium, 1939–1940]''. (London, Brassey's, 1990), p.178</ref>
===Superior German Army and tactics===[[File: Eric Von Manstein.jpg|thumbnail|300px|left|Eric Von Manstein.jpg 1940]]The German army developed the [[How Did the German Military Develop Blitzkrieg?|Blitzkrieg tactics]]. This was a tactic based on high-speed and mobile attacks Battle of France started on the enemy’s weak points and it proved devastating in France<ref> Bond, p. 111</ref>. The German victory was founded invasion on a plan developed by the great military strategiesMay 10th, General Erich von Manstein. He adopted the Schlieffen Plan that was used so nearly successful in WW I <ref> Bond1940, pand only lasted only 46 days. 117 </ref>. However, rather than advance on a broad front through Belgium, Paris fell to the Germans focused two-thirds of their forceson June 14th, including most of their tanks, in after the Ardennes region virtual collapse of Belgium. This area was weakly defended, as they believed that the terrain was unsuitable for tanks. When the Germans did attack through the Ardennes they caught the French and their British allies by surprisearmy. French believed it was impassable to tanksPrime Minister Paul Reynaud resigned on June 16th during the catastrophe. Having successfully made their way into FranceHis successor, Marshal Philippe Pétain, German forces then employed a tactic known as began negotiations to end the ‘sickle stroke’war. Sweeping across the northern plains of By June 25th, France at great speed, they divided the French and British forces into two parts. The British army was left isolated in Belgium and the French were left forced to bear the brunt of the German forces <ref>Blatt, Joel, <i>[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00EDY69LI/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=B00EDY69LI&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=98a5e102ae32052fa58ceb0d44dbe87b The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments]</i> (Providence, RI, Berghahn, 1997), p. 111</ref>surrender.
The German army was much superior to suffered 157,000 casualties during the French and invasion of France, but the BritishAllies' losses were considerably worse. Hitler The Allies lost over twice as many men and overall had built up the Germany army 360,000 casualties. A further two million men were captured. Some 300,000 British and in particular French troops escaped the air force (Luftwaffe)Germans after being evacuated by naval forces at Dunkirk. The Germans had developed superior weaponsoccupied the majority of France. In particularthe south of France, they had developed superior aircraft such as the Stuka dive bomber and Vichy Regime established a semi-autonomous political entity. Vichy maintained control over the Messerschmitt ME fighter plane, that wreaked havoc on majority of the allies French Colonies.<ref> BlattBond, Brian, p"[https://www.amazon. 117<com/gp/product/0080377009/ref>. The Germans placed a great deal of emphasis on mobile =as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0080377009&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=8c2293a2e966ba28b14946a14239a02d Britain, France, and armoured warfareBelgium, 1939–1940]". They had superior tanks(London, such as Panzer Mk ivBrassey's, which easily overcame the allies in almost every tank engagement in the Battle of France. It must be remembered that although the German army was superior to the French in many ways1990), that this did not mean that the Fall of France was inevitablep.178</ref>{{Mediawiki:TabletAd1}}
===French Tactics and Equipment were Poor=How did the German Army move so quickly through France? ==[[File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_121-0412,_Frankreich,_Panzer_Somua_S35,_GeschützEric Von Manstein.jpg|left|thumbnail|300px|Captured French Somua S35 tanks being used by Germany in left|Eric Von Manstein 1940.]]French military tactics were extremely outdated at Between the start of the war. They had failed to recognize that warfare had fundamentally changed since world wars, the First World War. They were over-reliant upon the Maginot Line and they believed that this would stop any German invasion in its track. Since they did not believe that could defeat Germany outright, they hoped that army developed the Maginot would drive up casualties [[What was Blitzkrieg and Germany to the negotiating table. They relied on defensive Who Created it|Blitzkrieg tactics and failed to grasp the impact of modern tanks and aircraft]]. This overstrategy was based on high-reliance speed and mobile attacks on the Maginot Line meant that they were too defensive. The Maginot Line also failed to protect the entire French border. Instead of attacking France directlyenemy’s weak points, Germany avoided the Maginot line by invading Belgium. French military planners has failed to plan for this contingency. The defensive line only partially defended France and indeed left the country open to an invasion via Belgium. The French High Command also failed to launch an offensive against Germany after the German attacked Poland. The French army simply hid behind the Maginot Line and waited for the Germans to attack. When the Germans finally did attack through the Ardennes the French army was trapped it proved devastating in bunkers and its fortifications were immediately outflanked. Even when the Germans invaded Belgium, the French General Staff continued with their cautious policy and were slow to respond to the German threatFrance.<ref> CooperBond, Mp. ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0517436108111</ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0517436108&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=089457e8c42c04ed8e9d351e9727ad63 > The German Army 1933–1945victory was founded on a plan developed by the great military strategies, Its Political and Military Failure]''General Erich von Manstein. He adopted the Schlieffen Plan that was almost successful in WW I. (Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day, 1978)<ref> Bond, p. 201 117 </ref>
While the French army was large and had been well resourcedHowever, it had not been modernized. It was still based rather than advance on the idea that the next war would resemble the Great War. As a resultbroad front through Belgium, the French did not believe that any war with GermanyGermans focused two-thirds of their forces, would be a mobile oneincluding most of their tanks, but rather a war in the Ardennes region of attritionBelgium. This meant that France and Belgium did reinforce the fortifications in this region because they failed to develop tank tactics assumed that took advantage of their the terrain was unsuitable for tanks offensive capabilities.<ref> Copper, p, 137</ref> Even when When the French did field effective equipment, such as Germans attack came through the SOMUA S35 tanksArdennes, they were mismanaged by caught the French calvary commanders. The Somua S35 tanks did not realize and their true potential until they were commandeered British allies by German commanders and utilized on the Eastern Front. During the invasion, German Panzer tanks quickly overcame surprise because the French defenses on the plains of Northern France. The French air forces were also not a match for the Germans in aerial combat. The French army believed it was unable impassable to cope with the German Blitzkrieg tactics and was quickly defeated after only six weeks of fightingtanks.<ref>Copper, p, 134</ref>
===Poor Military and Political Leadership===In 1940 Having successfully made their way into France, German forces then employed a tactic known as the French general staff was led by General Maurice Gamelan, an officer widely respected‘sickle stroke’. A veteran and war hero Sweeping across the northern plains of the First World WarFrance at great speed, he was credited developing the strategy that led to they divided the decisive French victory at the Marne in 1914and British forces into two parts. He had also tried unsuccessfully, to modernize the The British army. But Gamelin was suffering from a serious illness, whose symptoms included poor concentration levels, memory loss left isolated in Belgium and other cognitive difficulties Gamelin’s own memoirs, published after the war showed symptoms French were left to bear the brunt of paranoia and delusions of grandeurthe German forces.<ref>JacksonBlatt, Joel, Julian T. <i>[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0192805509B00EDY69LI/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0192805509B00EDY69LI&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=aa6895f6029c163adf1d3e187d64e538 98a5e102ae32052fa58ceb0d44dbe87b The Fall French Defeat of France1940: The Nazi Invasion of 1940Reassessments]</i>. (Oxford UPProvidence, 2003)RI, p. 234</ref> The military leadership below Gamelin was generally poor. They were slow to respond to the Germans and there was a marked reluctance to take any initiative and go on the attack. The political leadership of France was also very poor. According to one French commentator during the warBerghahn, they could not inspire the French people, they were more interested in fighting among themselves that the Germans.<ref>Jackson1997), p. 235111</ref>
France The German army was bitterly divided between substantially better than the left French and the rightBritish. This lack of unity in France was crippling at a crucial juncture Hitler had built up the German army and, in particular, the warair force (Luftwaffe). The division also extended to Germans had developed superior weapons. In particular, they had developed superior aircraft such as the relationships between Stuka dive bomber and the military and political leadership of France. The French Generals were rights wing and distrusted Messerschmitt ME fighter plane, which wreaked havoc on the left wing politicians who ran Franceallies. French ministers also did not trust the judgement of their generals<ref> Blatt, p. 117</ref> The French officer corps was more worried about a Communist revolution than Germans placed a German invasion. For example, General Weygand was more concerned with maintaining social stability in the wake great deal of the German invasion than actually fighting the Germansemphasis on mobile and armored warfare. Many later accused some French Generals of being traitors. Perhaps the greatest weakness in the French leadership was that they did not have a true war leaderThey had superior tanks, such as one Frenchman stated in 1942Panzer Mk iv, they ‘had no Churchill’. If France had a leader of which easily overcame the calibre of Clemenceau allies in almost every tank engagement in 1940, perhaps the outcome of the Battle of France could have been different. <ref> Why Did Even though the German army was superior to the French Army Collapse So Quickly? – <i>Omnibooks Magazine</i>, (London July, 1942), pin many ways the Fall of France was not inevitable. 6</ref>
===Defeatism in Was France=prepared for the German invasion? ==France was a powerful country with a large army and a vast Empire that stretched around the globe[[File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_121-0412,_Frankreich,_Panzer_Somua_S35, but it was not cohesive_Geschütz. It had stark political conflicts and many politicians were more loyal to their political party than their country. People on both the extreme Left such as the Communists or the extreme right hated the jpg|left|thumbnail|300px|Captured French government so virulently, their support of the French government be best described as half-hearted Somua S35 tanks being used by Germany in 1940 after the German invasionFall of France. Many ordinary people were disgusted with the leaders of the Third Republic, who ]]French military tactics were widely seen as professional politicians who were both venal and corrupt.<ref>Jackson, p.117</ref> Furthermore, defeatism was rampant extremely outdated at the start of WW IIthe war. France They had a low birth rate and many were convinced failed to recognize that warfare had fundamentally changed since the country was degenerating, based on ideas current at the timeFirst World War. <ref> Bloch, Marc, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0393319113/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0393319113&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0cThey were over-20&linkId=b9916b35c01e23b2ac59f9ebb5e33d42 Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940]'' (New Yorkreliant upon the Maginot Line, NY: Norton, 1946), p. 117</ref> The cultural pessimism in France meant and they believed that many, this would stop any German invasion in the political and military elite believed its track. Since they did not believe that France could not defeat Germany outright, they hoped that the Maginot would drive up casualties and that any efforts Germany to resist the Germans were pointlessnegotiating table. Many people believed that France was a nation in decline They relied on defensive tactics and that her greatest days had passed. This led failed to a spirit of defeatism in France in the Spring and Summer of 1940, that played an important role in the Fall of France. Despite grasp the valiant efforts impact of many French men against the German invasion, the French government modern tanks and military were ill-equipped both politically and militarily to meaningfully contest Germanyaircraft. <ref>Copper, p, 144</ref>
===Conclusion===While France was protected by The over-reliance on the Maginot Line and a fairly large army it put up little resistance meant that they were too defensive. The Maginot Line also failed to Germany. It only took a few weeks for protect the enitre country to fallentire French border. The reasons for the sudden defeat Instead of attacking France in 1940 were numerous and varied. They included a failure of leadershipdirectly, both at Germany avoided the Maginot line by invading Belgium. French military and the political levelplanners have failed to plan for this contingency. The army of defensive line only partially defended France was not only poorly led but had equipped with inferior arms and equipment. Moreover, indeed left the Maginot Line not only failed to protect France, but it encouraged a defensive mentality that allowed the Germans country open to take the initiative at crucial points during the an invasionvia Belgium. The French public were High Command also bitterly divided. These political divisions and incompetent leadership convinced many French citizens that their country could not defeat failed to launch an offensive against Germanyafter the German attacked Poland. All these combined factors combined ensured a swift between May and June 1940.<div class="portal" style="width:85%;">
The French army simply hid behind the Maginot Line and waited for the Germans to attack. When the Germans finally did attack through the Ardennes, the French army was trapped in bunkers, and its fortifications were immediately outflanked. Even when the Germans invaded Belgium, the French General Staff continued with their cautious policy and were slow to respond to the German threat.<ref> Cooper, M. ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0517436108/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0517436108&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=089457e8c42c04ed8e9d351e9727ad63 The German Army 1933–1945, Its Political and Military Failure]''. (Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day, 1978), p. 201 </ref>  <dh-ad/> While the French army was large and had been well resourced, it had not been modernized. It was still based on the idea that the next war would resemble the Great War. As a result, the French did not believe that any war with Germany, would be a mobile one, but rather a war of attrition. This meant that they failed to develop tank tactics that took advantage of their tanks offensive capabilities.<ref> Copper, p, 137</ref> Even when the French did effective field equipment, such as the SOMUA S35 tanks, they were mismanaged by French cavalry commanders. The Somua S35 tanks did not realize their true potential until German commanders commandeered them and utilized on the Eastern Front.  During the invasion, German Panzer tanks quickly overcame the French defenses on the plains of Northern France. The French air forces were also no match for the Germans in aerial combat. The French army was unable to cope with the German Blitzkrieg tactics and was quickly defeated after only six weeks of fighting.<ref>Copper, p, 134</ref> == Why did France have Poor Military and Political Leadership? ==In 1940, the French general staff was led by General Maurice Gamelan, an officer widely respected. A veteran and war hero of the First World War, he was credited with developing the strategy that led to the decisive French victory at the Marne in 1914. He had also tried unsuccessfully, to modernize the army. But Gamelin was suffering from a serious illness, whose symptoms included poor concentration levels, memory loss and other cognitive difficulties. Gamelin’s memoirs, published after the war, showed symptoms of paranoia and delusions of grandeur.<ref>Jackson, Julian T. <i>[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0192805509/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0192805509&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=aa6895f6029c163adf1d3e187d64e538 The Fall of France: The German Invasion of 1940]</i>. (Oxford UP, 2003), p. 234</ref> The military leadership below Gamelin was generally poor. They were slow to respond to the Germans, and there was a marked reluctance to take any initiative and go on the attack. The political leadership of France was also very poor. According to one French commentator during the war, they could not inspire the French people, they were more interested in fighting among themselves that the Germans.<ref>Jackson, p. 235</ref>  France was bitterly divided between the left and the right. This lack of unity in France was crippling at a crucial juncture in the war. The division also extended to the relationships between the military and political leadership of France. The French Generals were rights wing and distrusted the left-wing politicians who ran France. French ministers also did not trust the judgment of their generals. The French officer corps was more worried about a Communist revolution than a German invasion.  For example, General Weygand was more concerned with maintaining social stability in the wake of the German invasion than actually fighting the Germans. Many later accused some French Generals of being traitors. Perhaps the greatest weakness in the French leadership was that they did not have a true war leader; as one Frenchman stated in 1942 they ‘had no Churchill’. If France had a leader of the caliber of Clemenceau in 1940, perhaps the outcome of the Battle of France could have been different. <ref> Why Did the French Army Collapse So Quickly? – <i>Omnibooks Magazine</i>, (London July, 1942), p. 6</ref> == The Fall of France - What role did defeatism play? ==<div class="portal" style='float:right; width:35%'> ====Related DailyHistory.org Articles====
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{{MediawikiFrance was a powerful country with a large army and a vast Empire that stretched around the globe, but it was not cohesive. It had stark political conflicts, and many politicians were more loyal to their political party than their country. People on both the extreme Left such as the Communists or the extreme right hated the French government so virulently, their support of the French government could be best described as half-hearted after the German invasion.  Many ordinary people were disgusted with the leaders of the Third Republic, who were widely seen as professional politicians who were both venal and corrupt.<ref>Jackson, p.117</ref> Furthermore, defeatism was rampant at the start of WW II. France had a low birth rate, and many were convinced that the country was degenerating, based on ideas current at the time. <ref> Bloch, Marc, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0393319113/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0393319113&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=b9916b35c01e23b2ac59f9ebb5e33d42 Strange Defeat:WWII}}A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940]'' (New York, NY: Norton, 1946), p. 117</ref> The cultural pessimism in France meant that many, in the political and military elite believed that France could not defeat Germany and that any efforts to resist the Germans were pointless. Many people believed that France was a nation in decline and that her greatest days had passed. This led to a spirit of defeatism in France in the Spring and Summer of 1940, that played an important role in the Fall of France. Despite the valiant efforts of many French men against the German invasion, the French government and military were ill-equipped both politically and militarily to meaningfully contest Germany. <ref>Copper, p, 144</ref> == Conclusion ==While France was protected by the Maginot Line and a fairly large army, it put up little resistance to Germany. It only took a few weeks for the entire country to fall. The reasons for the sudden defeat of France in 1940 were numerous and varied.  They included a failure of leadership, both at the military and the political level. The army of France was not only poorly led but had been equipped with inferior arms and equipment. Moreover, the Maginot Line not only failed to protect France, but it encouraged a defensive mentality that allowed the Germans to take the initiative at crucial points during the invasion. The French public was also bitterly divided.  These political divisions and incompetent leadership convinced many French citizens that their country could not defeat Germany. All these factors combined ensured a swift between May and June 1940. ====References====
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[[Category:French History]] [[Category:Military History]][[Category:World War Two History]][[Category:European History]] [[Category:20th Century History]]
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Updated January 18, 2019

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