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[[File: Kursk 1.jpg|thumbnail|300px|Fighting German troops fighting at Kurskin 1943]]
The Battle of Kursk took place in July 1943 and was one of the largest and most important battles fought on the Eastern Front during World War II. Kursk was the largest tank battle in history and it was the last attempt by the German army to slow down the Soviet Mlitary. Kursk was the last throw of the dice for Germany on the Eastern Front. The failure of the German offensive at Kursk dealt a severe blow to the Nazi army. After the battle, Germany adopted a defensive posture on the Eastern Front. Why did Germany fail to achieve their objectives at the Battle of Kursk?
The Germans managed to stabilize the situation after Stalingrad and had even managed to inflict a heavy defeat on the Soviets at Kharkov. By the spring of 1943, the German’s felt confident enough to plan for another offensive in the East.<ref> Bellamy, p. 178</ref> Still, they were losing ground to the Soviets. Germany wanted to prove to Soviets and the western allies that they were not fatally weakened after Stalingrad. <ref>Antill, Peter, ''Stalingrad 1942'' (Osprey Publishing, London, 2007), p. 18</ref>. By the summer of 1943, the Russians had advanced west and retaken territory in the Ukraine. Hitler was determined to reverse the recent Soviet gains and to push them back to the east. On the Eastern Front, there was a bulge in the front line between Orel and Kharkov. Right at the heart of this bulge was Kursk. This bulge meant that the Soviets could possibly outflank the Germans and this could lead to the collapse of their front line. The German High Command was very concerned about the bulge and believed that it needed to be removed. The German generals decided to destroy the bulge in their lines. They intended to cut-off the Soviet Troops occupying the bulge and inflict a devastating defeat on the Soviet Union. <ref>Bellamy, p. 156</ref> This plan persuaded the Nazi High Command to launch Operation Citadel, an offensive to retake the bulge on the Eastern Front. Hitler backed the plan in April 1943 and he expected the ‘’victory at Kursk will be a beacon for the whole world.” <ref> Victor, George, ''Hitler: Pathology of Evil''(Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc.2008) p. 208</ref>
==The reasons for Why Kursk?==[[File: Kursk 2.jpg|thumbnail|275px|German infantry at Kursk]]A successful German offensive would have greatly improved Germany’s strategic position on the Easter Front. The Germans believed that the Soviet leadership had become increasingly disenchanted with their western Allies<ref> George, p. 167</ref>. Despite constant demands, the British and the Americans had failed to open a ‘second front’ in western Europe. If the Nazi forces inflict a devastating defeat on Stalin’s armies, then the Soviets would be more likely to enter into peace negotiations with the Germans and end their alliance with Britain and the United States. This could have allowed the Germans to keep many of their gains in the east and to concentrate on their war with the western allies. Then the Germany was becoming increasingly confident, despite the recent setbacks on the Eastern Front and in North Africa. This was because, by the spring of 1943, the German armed forces were better armed than ever before. Hitler had appointed Albert Speer as head of the armaments industry and he had massively increased production. Germany, despite constant air attacks and limited natural resources, increased the number of munitions and weapons, greatly<ref> Barbier, Mary Kathryn, Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 (Zenith Imprint 2002), p. 113.</ref>.. In 1943 the Nazi armaments sector produced almost 12,000 tanks and had increased by 100% the number of planes made by manufacturers. Not only did the German industrial sector produce more of everything, but also they produced more advanced weaponry. The Germans had developed new tanks such as the Tiger, King Tiger, and the Panther tanks. The Luftwaffe (German air force), had the new Fokker-Wolfe 190A fighter and the Herschel 129<ref> Barbier, p. 117</ref>. The Germans since the loss of North Africa meant that they could concentrate the majority of their army on the Eastern Front. The failure of the allies to open up a second front, allowed Hitler to station two-thirds of the German Army in Russia, by the Spring of 1943. However, the new weapons and extra manpower caused the German High Command to engage in over-optimistic planning. Based on their new weaponry they assumed that they could inflict a serious defeat on Stalin and led them to underestimate the enemy. [[File: Kursk 2.jpg|thumbnail|200px|German infantry at Kursk]]
Germany, despite constant air attacks and limited natural resources, increased the number of munitions and weapons, greatly<ref> Barbier, Mary Kathryn, Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 (Zenith Imprint 2002), p. 113.</ref>.. In 1943 the Nazi armaments sector produced almost 12,000 tanks and had increased by 100% the number of planes made by manufacturers. Not only did the German industrial sector produce more of everything, but also they produced more advanced weaponry. The Germans had developed new tanks such as the Tiger, King Tiger, and the Panther tanks. The Luftwaffe (German air force), had the new Fokker-Wolfe 190A fighter and the Herschel 129<ref> Barbier, p. 117</ref>. The Germans since the loss of North Africa meant that they could concentrate the majority of their army on the Eastern Front. The failure of the allies to open up a second front, allowed Hitler to station two-thirds of the German Army in Russia, by the Spring of 1943. However, the new weapons and extra manpower caused the German High Command to engage in over-optimistic planning. Based on their new weaponry they assumed that they could inflict a serious defeat on Stalin and led them to underestimate the enemy.
==German failures before the Battle. ==
Hitler decreed that “there must be no failure” during Operation Citadel. Learning from their mistakes from Stalingrad when poor intelligence had proven to be disastrous, they collected all the intelligence that they could get. Reconnaissance planes photographed all the defensive systems that the Soviets had established in the Kursk and Oriel bulge. Despite the vast efforts spent on this intelligence gathering information the Germans had failed to establish the size of the Russian forces in the area. Even though the Germans had acquired a great deal of information, they interpreted it incorrectly <ref> Barbier, p. 113</ref>. This misled the Germans into overestimating their chances of success in the coming offensive. However, Russia’s military leaders had suspected that there would be an attack on the bulge between Kursk and Oriel. They believed that the Germans had to attempt to remove the bulge at Kursk. Soviet intelligence was excellent- they had first-hand accounts of German armor send to the Oriel-Kharkov region<ref> Zhukov, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich & Harrison E., Salisbury, Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 116</ref>. The Soviets had even captured some German officers who during interrogation divulged that the offensive would be in the Kursk area and even gave the date of the coming German attack. The better Soviet intelligence meant that they had a decided advantage even before the battle had started <ref> Zhukov, p 234</ref>.
[[File:Kursk Soviet machineguns.jpg|thumbnail|200px|Soviet Soldiers at Kursk]]
