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The Nazi invasion had been facilitated by the indecisiveness of Stalin who was taken aback by Hitler’s betrayal. He initially refused to believe the reports of a German invasion. The supreme leader of the Soviets possibly suffered a nervous breakdown in the early stages of the Nazi invasion. However, after a period of time, he helped direct the Soviet counter-attack. By the autumn of 1941, it appeared that Germany’s ''blitzkrieg'' tactics would lead to the defeat of the Red army. However, winter arrived early that year and this slowed down the German advance. Russians spoke of ‘General Winter’- who would help them to win the war. <ref>Bellamy, p. 67</ref> The Soviet people were well aware that the severe Russian winters would slow if not halt the German advance, just as it had stopped Napoleon and Charles XII of Sweden, during previous invasions. By December 1941, the German’s vanguard was ‘some fifty miles from Moscow.’<ref>Antill, p. 45</ref>  However, the weather was cold and German soldiers had begun to suffer in the harsh conditions. The Soviet’s used the weather to their advantage. The Soviets stationed huge forces in the east in to defend Siberia from a Japanese invasion. He withdrew them and under General George Zhukov. They were then organized into a strike force aimed at repelling the German advance on Moscow. On December 12th, Zhukov’s army launched a surprise attack on the German frontline and pushed them back with heavy losses some one hundred miles from Moscow.<ref> MacDonald, John. ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0785830979/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0785830979&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=ff12114d460899b1d3d40f8245e19df5 Great Battles of World War II]'' (London, Michael Joseph books, 1986), p. 245</ref> The Soviet Capital had been saved. However, despite the setback, the Germans had a secure hold over much of western Soviet Union and had laid siege to the city of Leningrad.

Hitler saw the war in terms of his personal rivalry with Stalin and he decided to attack the city, because of its symbolic value. However, the original aim of the offensive in Southern Russian was to secure the oil fields in the Caucasus. The oil was essential for the German war machine. Hitler knew this – instead of opting for concentrating all his forces on the conquest of the oil fields, he made perhaps a fateful mistake. He divided his forces. It has long been one of the fundamental beliefs in military strategy that it was reckless to divide one’s forces in enemy territory. However, this is exactly what Hitler did, contrary to all the advice of his Generals.<ref> Beevor, Antony, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0140284583/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0140284583&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=19c551047636454c9c37c00ac3d62654 Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943]'' (Viking, London, 1998), p. 117</ref> He sent some of the German army south to take the oil fields in the Caucuses and their prime objective was Baku.

Furthermore, Hitler in his obsession to seize the city meant that he was not fully aware of the situation around the city. For example, German forces had been unable to push back Soviet forces during the series of battles known as the Kolton Operations. This left the Germans exposed on their flanks as they pressed further into the city. Because Hitler divided the German forces, the flank of the 6th army was insufficiently protected.<ref>Beevor, p. 156</ref> Poorly trained Romanian and Italian forces guarded the flanks and many German commanders privately believed that they could not protect their rear from Soviet attack.  Hitler’s determination to capture Stalingrad meant that he dispatched the 6th army on a mission that was unlikely to achieve its objectives and placed it at great risk. Hitler's interference hampered the 6th Army's throughout the siege of Stalingrad. Hitler's style of leadership was the complete opposite of Stalin's. The Soviet leader, had reformed the Soviet High Command, the ''Stavka'', and granted ‘more autonomy and independence’ to capable generals such as Zhukhov.<ref> Zhukov, Georgiĭ Konstantinovich & Harrison E., Salisbury, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0815410980/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0815410980&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=557435d4a5b0f047e76ecac237f82afd Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles]'' (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 116</ref> The leader of the Soviet Union had learned lessons from the early days of Operation Barbarossa. He let his generals do the fighting and draw up the strategies needed to beat the Germans. <ref>Beevor, p. 178</ref>.

The Germans launched a massive air assault on the city, under the command of General Paulus. Much of the city was reduced to rubble. The German’s devoted some of their finest units to the capture of the city, much against senior Generals such as Von Kleist’s wishes, who openly opposed Hitler’s wish to capture the city. In August of 1942, the Germans fought their way into the city, which was at first lightly defended. The Soviet commander of the Soviet forces was Vasily Chuikov, who was 42 years old and led the Soviet 62nd Army. He was to prove to be an indomitable fighter and an inspirational leader.</ref> Beevor, p. 173</ref> He organized his army and many of the city's civilians into a formidable defensive force.

===Hitler’s Intransigence===

Hitler believed that if German soldiers were well-led and motivated then there was nothing that they could not do, no enemy that they could not defeat. Hitler when he heard that his army was on the point of being encircled at Stalingrad, ordered that the 6th Army should not retreat and he demanded that they fight on with greater zeal. Hitler, while admitting that the situation in Stalingrad was dire, believe that if the German soldiers and their officers had faith in the final victory then they would be victorious. This belief meant that Hitler curbed his officers' ability to respond to the developing situation on the ground.<ref> Victor, George, ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1574882287/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=1574882287&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=d61400f1302fc7d3b6fbc427e2295674 Hitler: Pathology of Evil]'' (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc.2008) p. 208</ref>

The Soviet counteroffensive, which was launched on 19th November, from the Kalmyk Steeped, in a pincer movement, simultaneously attacked the Germans from the North and outflanked the 6th army. Eventually, the Red Army would come to completely encircle the Germans, but this took a week or more to achieve. In this time, Paulus could have retreated west and towards Von Manstein who was fighting in the Crimea.<ref> Anthill, p. 156</ref> Before the encirclement was complete, Paulus should have left Stalingrad and ordered a retreat. However, because of Hitler's order to not retreat under any circumstances, Paulus stayed in Stalingrad and he and his army became trapped in the city on the 23rd of November, 1942. Over a quarter of a million Germans had been cut-off in the city on the Volga. Undoubtedly, Paulus own indecisive character played its part, but Hitler’s orders to stand and fight and never to concede ground meant that the Germans did not conduct a tactical retreat and avoid the slow death of the 6th army in the winter of 1942-43.<ref>Beevor, p. 158</ref>

The failed Luftwaffe efforts to supply German soldiers caused morale in the city to fall. Many German officers even argued that they should surrender. During December 19th, the gifted German General Eric von Manstein and a significant number of German division attempted to reach Stalingrad. Operation Winter Storm was initially successful, despite it occurring during the depths of winter. Von Man stein’s forces came within thirty kilometers of the besieged Germans, but Paulus refused to breakout and link up with the relief forces. He possibly could have saved some of his forces. However, this would have required him to disobey Hitler’s explicit orders. In the end, he refused to do so and the opportunity was lost. If Hitler had allowed his generals more flexibility, then Von Paulus could have saved some of his divisions from complete annihilation.<ref> Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. ''[https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0312868537/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=0312868537&linkCode=as2&tag=dailyh0c-20&linkId=91516cd718a10f8a333413ab02d19515 199 Days: The Battle for Stalingrad]'' (New York: A Forge Book, 1999), p. 167</ref>

{{Mediawiki:WWII}}===References===