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== The Teheran Conference ==
Soviet leader Josef Stalin was clamoring for the Allied invasion of Europe since early 1943. In order to relieve some of the pressure in their battle with Germany, the Soviet Army needed their allies to engage Hitler’s army from the western side of Germany’s border. By opening a second front in Western Europe, Germany would be forced to re-allocate troops, supplies, and equipment from their battle lines on the east, thereby affording the Soviets a slight reprieve in their tenacious battle with the Germans. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill; however, was adamant that the Italian and Mediterranean campaigns retain the highest priority. United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was also hesitant of a 1943 invasion as German U-boats continued to fiercely patrol the Atlantic Ocean.<ref>Michael J. Lyons,''World War II: A Short History,'' 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010), 246. For an excellent account of the discussion of a second front in 1943, see Walter S. Dunn,'' Second Front Now ̶ ̶ ̶ 1943'' (University of Alabama Press, 1980).</ref>
[[File:1021px-Teheran_conference-1943.jpg|thumbnail|left|300px|The "Big Three" at the Teheran Conference, November 1943. (l-r) Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill.]]
The submarines, which patrolled either singly or in a group known as a “wolf-pack,” wreaked havoc on U.S. shipping until the spring of 1943, thereby creating shortages in England of supplies, equipment, landing craft, ships, and troops. F.D.R. and Churchill maintained that due to the German submarine attacks on Merchant Marine vessels, there simply were not enough men and equipment to forge such a massive invasion. There is a debate in the scholastic world as to whether it was possible and feasible for the Allies to launch the invasion in 1943 and end the war that much sooner. Some historians support the logic of Churchill and F.D.R. in that the shortages were too great and that the Italian campaign was affording much needed experience to untried soldiers; especially the Americans. Conversely, others aver that in 1943 Germany was much weaker than in 1944 and by delaying, Hitler had time to build up troops and supplies. Arguably, the limited resources of the Allies were adequate to wage a victorious campaign against the equally weak German Army. In 1943, there were forty-nine second-line German divisions stationed in France. By 1944, additional armor and nine divisions of men were added.<ref>Lyons, 246.</ref>In order to come to an agreement on the specifics of the invasion, “The Big Three,” Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met together for the first time in November 1943 at the Teheran Conference.
== Why Normandy? ==
[[File:gerd von rundstedt.jpg|thumbnail|300px|left|Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.]]
Normandy was not a port city, thereby making a great amphibious invasion cumbersome and problematic. Cherbourg and Le Havre, west and east of Normandy respectively, were considered and quickly declined as options for the invasion. Although these were port cities and thus would have facilitated the landings, these very reasons made them obvious choices, thereby affording Germany to mount an impregnable defense. Another accommodating site was Pas de Calais as it was just twenty miles from the coast of England. This is where the Germans expected the landing to take place and amassed defenses on the beaches of Calais accordingly. The Allies discovered this through their decoding system known as Ultra and used this knowledge to their advantage. The German commanders, except Hitler, did not consider Normandy a feasible site as it lacked ports to accommodate landings and create a supply line. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of all German forces in Western Europe, and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who was the ground forces leader, both believed Calais was the target.
