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The French army was large and had been well resourced. However, it had not been modernized. It was still based on the idea that the next war would be like WW I. As a result, the French did not believe that any war with Germany, would be a mobile one, but would rather be a war of attrition, a repeat of WWI. This meant that they failed to develop their tank formations, in particular<ref> Copper, p, 137</ref>. This meant that the German Panzer tanks were able to quick and powerful and quickly overcame the French on the plains of Northern France. The French also neglected their air force and many of their planes were not match for the Germans in aerial combat. The French army was unable to cope with the German Blitzkrieg tactics and therefore defeated in less than six weeks <ref> Copper, p, 134</ref>.
==Poor Military and Political Leadership==
In 1940 the French general staff was led by General Maurice Gamelan, an officer widely respected. A veteran and war hero of the First World War, he was credited developing the strategy that led to the decisive French victory at the Marne in 1914. He had also tried unsuccessfully, to modernize the army. But Gamelin was suffering from a serious illness, whose symptoms included poor concentration levels, memory loss and other cognitive difficulties Gamelin’s own memoirs, published after the war showed symptoms of paranoia and delusions of grandeur <ref> Jackson, Julian T. The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940. Oxford UP, 2003), p. 234</ref>.. The military leadership below Gamelin was generally poor. They were slow to respond to the Germans and there was a marked reluctance to take the initiative and go on the attack. The political leadership of France was also very poor. According to one French commentator during the war, they could not inspire the French people, they were more interested in fighting among themselves that the Germans<ref> Jackson, p 235</ref>. France was bitterly divided between the left and the right and this meant that there was a lack of unity in France at a critical juncture. Moreover, the military and political leadership of France was divided. The French Generals were rights wing and distrusted the left wing politicians and many French ministers did not trust the Generals. Many of the French officer corps were more worried about a Communist revolution than the Germans. For example, General Weygand was more concerned with maintaining social stability in the wake of the German invasion that actually fighting the Germans. Many later accused some French Generals of being traitors. Perhaps the greatest weakness in the French leadership was that they did not have a true war leader, as one Frenchman stated in 1942, they ‘had no Churchill’. If France had a leader of the calibre of Clemenceau in 1940, the outcome of the Battle of France could have been different <ref> Why Did the French Army Collapse So Quickly? – Omnibooks Magazine, (London July, 1942), p. 6 </ref> .
==Defeatism in France==
France was a powerful country with a large army and a vast Empire, that stretched around the globe. The country because of political differences was not unified and many were more loyal to their political party that the country. Many on both the extreme Left such as the Communists or the extreme right hated the French government so much, that they were only half-hearted in their response to the German invasion. Many ordinary people were disgusted with the leaderS of the Third Republic, who were widely seen as professional politicians who were venal and corrupt <ref>Jackson, p. 117</ref>. Furthermore, there was a general air of defeatism in the air at the start of WW II. France had a low birth rate and many were convinced that the country was degenerating, based on ideas current at the time <ref> Bloch, Marc Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940 (New York, NY: Norton, 1946), p. 117</ref>. The cultural pessimism in France meant that many, in the political and military elite believed that France could not win against the Germans and that any efforts to resist the Germans were pointless. Many believed that France was a nation in decline and that her greatest days had passed. This led to a spirit of defeatism in France in the Spring and Summer of 1940, that played an important role in the Fall of France. It must be noted that many French men and women were very patriotic and resisted the Germans with great bravery<ref> Copper, p, 144</ref>.
==Conclusion==
On the face of it the Fall of France, in so short a period, was remarkable. The country was protected by the Maginot Line and by a large army. It was allied to the British, who had the largest Empire in the world and was a great industrial power. However, the country fell in a matter of weeks. The reasons for the sudden defeat of France in 1940 were various. They included a failure of leadership, both at the military and the political level. The army of France was not only poor led but had inferior arms and equipment. Moreover, the Maginot Line not only failed to protect France, but it encouraged a defensive mentality that allowed the Germans to have the initiative at crucial periods. The French were bitterly divided between Many French people were pessimistic about the country and had no faith in their country’s ability to defeat the Germans. All these factors combined to ensure that the country was swiftly defeated in May-June 1940.
