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Eugene Holt Eastman was one of the first Osteopaths prosecuted for practicing Osteopathy. Eastman was unique because he was tried in two separate states, Illinois and Ohio, for practicing Osteopathy in two consecutive years. He was a graduate of the newly formed American School of Osteopathy in Kirksville, Missouri.<ref> Eastman v. Ohio, 6 Ohio Dec. 296, 297 (1897).</ref>As a practicing Osteopath, Eastman’s treatment “consisted wholly of rubbing and manipulating the affected parts with his hands and fingers, and flexing and moving the limbs of the patient in various ways.”<ref> Eastman v. People, 71 Ill. App. 236, 238 (1896).</ref> Eastman argued to the Illinois Board of Health that he was not a practicing physician because he did not prescribe medicine or use instruments to treat his patients.<ref> Eastman, 238.</ref> The Illinois board ignored his arguments and determined that he was a physician. The Illinois board ruled that Eastman was a physician because he stated that his treatments could cure a “long list of diseases” relying only on the “manipulation, flexing, rubbing, extension” of his client’s limbs. Both the Illinois board and the court of appeal simply defined medicine as “the art of understanding diseases and curing or relieving them when possible.”<ref>Eastman, 239.</ref> Under this definition, Eastman was found to be practicing medicine and his conviction was upheld.
After the Illinois board’s decision, Eastman left Illinois and moved to Akron, Ohio, late in 1896. In Akron, he continued his Osteopathic practice, but within one month he was charged with practicing medicine without a license. Contrary to the Illinois Court of Appeals, the Court of Common Pleas in Ohio did not believe that Eastman was a practicing physician. The court refused to find that Osteopaths, clairvoyants, mind healers, faith -curers, massage therapists, and Christian Scientists were physicians under the Ohio licensing statute. If the legislature sought to ban or regulate these practices, the court argued it would need to do so explicitly, as Iowa had done.<ref> Eastman v. Ohio, 299-301.</ref>
In 1899, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Liffring supported the earlier lower court decision in the Eastman case and confirmed that Osteopathy did not constitute the practice of medicine in Ohio. A grand jury indicted William Liffring for practicing with a license, but went to the circuit couret court and quashed the indictment. The state sought to overturn the lower court’s decision and prosecute Liffring for violating the state’s licensing law. Prosecutors argued that medicine had “a wider significance than has the word drug.” They also cited “The Ohio Osteopath,” which was published by the faculty of the Ohio Institute of Osteopathy. This publication identified fifty diseases that could be treated successfully by Osteopathy. The court disagreed and found that the practice of medicine required the use of “drug or medicine.”<ref> State v. Liffring, 61 Ohio St. 39; 55 N.E. 168 (1899), 39-51.</ref>
In Nelson v. State Board of Health, an Osteopath named Harry Nelson filed a petition of equity to enjoin the Kentucky State Board of Health from harassing him. Nelson was concerned that the board was going to prosecute him for violating the state’s practice and he sought to short -circuit their efforts. They refused to enjoin the board from enforcing the law against Nelson. After the lower Law and Equity Division entered a judgment in favor of the board, Nelson asked the Kentucky court of appeals to reverse the decision and force the board to recognize his college, the American College of Osteopathy in Kirksville, as legitimate under the state’s medical practice act.<ref> Nelson v. State Board of Health, 108 Ky. 769, (1900), 770-774.</ref>
The Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that American College of Osteopathy was not a reputable medical college, but it still found in Nelson’s favor. The court found that Osteopathy did not constitute the practice of medicine and it was unnecessary to for the board to evaluate Nelson’s school. The court stated that because Osteopaths did not prescribe drugs or conduct surgery, they were not physicians. Therefore, Nelson’s medical speciality specialty was not covered by the Kentucky medical practice act, and the state’s board of health had absolutely no right to interfere. The American College of Osteopathy was not a legitimate medical school because its graduates did not practice medicine. The court cited Liffring in support of its decision. <ref>Nelson, 779-781</ref>
The Supreme Court of Nebraska also wrestled with a similar question of whether Osteopathy was a recognizable part of the practice of medicine. Charles Little, an Osteopath, was convicted of practicing medicine without a license. Little argued at trial that he was not a physician under the Nebraska medical practice act. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected Little’s argument and found that “those who practice osteopathy for compensation come within the purview of the statue as clearly as those who practice what is known as ‘Christian Science,’ and therefore this case f[ell] within the principle of State v. Buswell.” While the court acknowledged that other courts’ decisions around the country were “in conflict with it,” it was satisfied with its decision because Osteopaths and physicians had the same goals. They both sought to restore “the patient to sound bodily or mental condition.” The court was not interested in quibbling over whether the practice of medicine required physicians to prescribe drugs. <ref>Little v. Nebraska, 60 Neb. 749 (1900), 751-752.</ref>
Unlike the court in Little, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision focused directly on the notion of whether the practice of medicine required use of medicines. In Bragg v. State, E. Eugene Bragg was convicted by the Jefferson County Criminal Court of practicing medicine without a license and violating the Alabama medical practice act. Bragg appealed to the state’s supreme court to overturn his conviction. Bragg’s defense was that he was not engaged in the practice of medicine because he did not use medicines. The court rejected his claim and stated “the word medicine has a technical meaning, is a technical art or science, and as a science the practitioners are not simply those who prescribe drugs or other medicinal substances as remedial agents, but it is broad enough to include and does include all person who diagnose diagnoses diseases and prescribe prescribes or apply any therapeutic agent for its cure.” The court cited Bibber v. Simpson in support of its decision. As discussed earlier in Bibber, the Maine Supreme Court determined that the actions of a medical clairvoyant constituted the practice of medicine. Bragg is another example of a court that took a broader interpretation of what constituted the practice of medicine.
Since, the courts were deadlocked over the issue of Osteopathy, Osteopaths quickly realized that the only way to ensure the survival of their medical speciality specialty was to lobby for their own licensing laws. While a majority of courts exempted Osteopaths from licensing laws, Osteopaths wanted their practice to be not only be legal throughout the country, but legitimate. Like Regulars and Irregulars, Osteopaths quickly organized themselves in medical societies and created research journals. Aside from giving Osteopaths a sheen of respectability, the infrastructure gave Osteopaths a way to wage a concerted campaign to secure licensing. Between 1897 and 1901, fifteen states passed separate licensing laws for Osteopaths. Unsurprisingly, most of these state states were in the Midwest, but New York, California, and Connecticut also passed laws favoring Osteopaths.
These new laws were not ideal. In order to secure medical licensing, Osteopaths lobbied in favor of laws that were not always particularly beneficial to them. They struggled to get traction in state legislatures, because Osteopaths were hampered by their small numbers, the relative youth of the specialty, disorganized campaigns, and lack of agreement among themselves about the type of laws that were most appropriate. In many states, efforts to secure legislation flamed out. In the states where Osteopaths secured licensing, they often were placed at the mercy of licensing boards that they did not have any representation on.
One of these states was Illinois which passed a new licensing law in 1899 designed to license Osteopaths and other medical specialists. Under the new law, the practice of medicine was broadly defined to include physicians who practiced medicine and surgery in all their branches and anyone who wished to practice a specific system of medicine without the use of medicine or instruments. This law was designed to put the state board of health in charge of all medical practitioners including midwives, Osteopaths and potentially Christian Scientists. Physicians from the three major medical sects controlled the board and Osteopaths had little say over how the law was administered. Even under the 1887 medical practice act, practitioners who rubbed or manipulated their patients were classified as physicians. Suffice it to say, the state’s new law did not necessarily help Osteopaths. Under Illinois law, Osteopath were required to meet the same standards as all other physicians. They were not given a lower standard to become a physician in the state. Laws like Illinois‘ would require Osteopathic schools of medicine to rethink their school’s curriculum to help their students pass licensing exams.
