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→Long-term Factors in the Outbreak of War
In 440 BCE, Corinth urged the Spartans to wage war on Athens at the same time as Cornith was suppressing a revolt on the island of Samos. The Spartan Kings were cautious and decided to avoid war. However, the Thirty Years Peace was under increasing strain. In the Spartan assembly, they were growing alarmed at the growth of Athenian power.<ref> Kagan, p. 134</ref> As Athens seemed to be growing more powerful, there was a growing pro-war party in Sparta. They argued that the Spartans had to attack Athens before it became too powerful. The fear of Athens increasingly led the Spartans to prepare for war, even though there is no evidence that the Athenians had any designs on Sparta or its allies.<ref>Kagan, p. 213</ref> Additionally, there were those in Athens who believed that a war should be welcomed. There was a strong ‘imperial’ party in Athens who believed that it was entitled to a great empire because of its role in the defeat of the Persians. Sparta's concerns were not entirely unfounded.
The belief Greek historian Thucydides argued that Spartan feared Sparta's fear of Athens was the ultimate cause of the war was the view of the Greek historian Thucydides. According to Thucydides, the growth of the ‘power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon (Sparta), made war inevitable."<ref>Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> 1.67–71</ref> "He Thucydides believed that the Peloponnesian War was inevitable, because when a rising power confronted another power, they would inevitably wage a war against each other to further or protect their interests.<ref>Thucydides, <i>The Peloponnesian War</i> 1.67–71 </ref>. Some later historians have also argued that war was inevitable between the two greatest Greek powers. It is still widely held that in international relations, the growth of a nation-state or empire will inevitably lead to rivalry and war with an established power.<ref>Kagan, p. 71 </ref>
====Sparta and Athens====
