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[[File:operation-rolling-thunder.jpg|thumbnail|left|400px250px|Operation Rolling Thunder]]__NOTOC__

After the clash of US forces and North Vietnamese forces in the Gulf of Tonkin and the North Vietnamese' subsequent phantom attacks by the North Vietnamese on the USS Maddox and USS XXX, the United States Congress passed [official name] more commonly known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolutions which . The Resolutions gave the president far greater latitude to coordinate and carry out military strikes without an official declaration of war. The United States and the Johnson administration put those new powers to use in 1965.

One of If not the themes, if not major theme, over one of the course of themes throughout 1965 was the build -up of American troops in South Vietnam. At the beginning of the year , there were was just over 23,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam. This number grew steadily over the year and until 1968, but with each increase in troops, each strategic decision was often debated in the Johnson Administration. There was a decided tension between civilian leaders, military commanders in Washington , and the military commanders in the country.

As early as January of 1965, the ambassador to South Vietnam, Maxwell Taylor , did not advocate deployment of US ground troops ' deployment into the country. RatherInstead, he supported actions to disrupt the supply chain from North Vietnam, commonly referred to as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Taylor believed that if the United States did not stop the aid streaming from the north, South Vietnam would fall to the communists.

Taylor was not the only government official who thought the Vietnam's situation in Vietnam was dire, though they took a different tacttack. Senator Forrester Church from Montana spoke from the senate Senate floor, calling on the United States to begin the process of negotiation with North Vietnam and declare the South a neutral country. A number of Several fellow senators and world leaders supported the Church’s ideas, though the White House did not. Later in 1965, Undersecretary of State George Ball, privately spoke out against US troop buildup. He saw it as a poor strategy because, in essence, the war in Vietnam was a civil war. He theorized that the Viet Cong were not outside agitators from the north (though supported by Hanoi) but organic to South Vietnam. Like Church, his ideas were not enough to sway the administration.

In additionLater in 1965, voices outside Undersecretary of the government were becoming wary of the warState George Ball privately spoke out against US troop buildup. Walter LippmanHe saw it as a poor strategy because, a very influential newspaper writer in Washington DC saw nothing but failure if essence, the United States continued to escalate their involvement war in Vietnamwas a civil war. Though it was He theorized that the Viet Cong were not outside agitators from the first civilian group north (though supported by Hanoi) but organic to speak out against the war, the first formal “teach-in” was organized at the University of Michigan, critiquing US involvement in southeast asiaSouth Vietnam. Over 3Like Church,000 people attended. By April, 20,000 people gathered in Washington DC his ideas were not enough to protest US involvement in Vietnamsway the administration.

In April Also, voices outside of the government were becoming weary of 1965the war. Walter Lippman, President Johnson delivered a pivotal speech at Johns Hopkins Universityvery influential newspaper writer in Washington, DC, saw nothing but a failure if the United States continued to escalate their involvement in Vietnam. The president outlined for Though it was not the first time a possible path civilian group to peace by negotiating with speak out against the North Vietnamese. In essencewar, Johnson declared that the US first formal “teach-in” was open to discussions organized at the University of a peaceful solutionMichigan, but did not offer any real specificscritiquing US involvement in Southeast Asia. He did proposeOver 3, in addition to continued military assistance to the south000 people attended. By April, a program in the Mekong River area20, 000 people gathered in both the north and south, of rigorous modernization of the region. He compared it the the Tennessee Valley Authority of a generation before during the New Deal. The North Vietnamese bluntly stated that no negotiations would take place as long as the Washington DC to protest US military was still involvement in the southVietnam.

That same monthIn April of 1965, some divisions within President Johnson delivered a pivotal speech at Johns Hopkins University. The president outlined for the US high command began first time a possible path to showpeace by negotiating with the North Vietnamese. While Ambassador Taylor wanted more air strikesIn essence, he was wary of a greater amount of offensive operations. General Westmoreland, however, believed Johnson declared that the US needed was open to become more aggressive. In discussions of a meeting that the ambassador peaceful solution but did not attend, Westmoreland recommended two army brigades be brought into South Vietnam offer any real specifics. In addition to secure more airfields but continued military assistance to also prepare an area near Saigonthe south, he did propose a program in the South Vietnamese capitalMekong River area, for entire US Army division. On April 20, 1965 in both the US presence had grown to 33north and south,000 troops, with 20,000 more expected. The increase of rigorous modernization of resources for the Vietnam War wasn’t restricted region. He compared it to military personnel numbers. President Johnson requested an additional $700 million for the war effortTennessee Valley Authority of a generation before the New Deal. Congress approved this request in only two days, demonstrating The North Vietnamese bluntly stated that overall, no negotiations would occur as long as the US commitment to South Vietnam and the war military was still quite strongin the south.

====Operation Rolling Thunder and Deepening Commitment===Prior That same month, some divisions within the US high command began to Johnson’s Johns Hopkins speech the United States forces increased bombing show. While Ambassador Taylor wanted more airstrikes, he was wary of a greater amount of North Vietnamese targetsoffensive operations. General Westmoreland, however, code named Operation Rolling Thunderbelieved the US needed to become more aggressive. The campaign had been in In a meeting that the planning stages before ambassador did not attend, Westmoreland recommended two army brigades be brought into South Vietnam to secure more airfields and prepare an area near Saigon, the Gulf of Tonkin incidentSouth Vietnamese capital, but Johnson delayed such aggressive actionfor the entire US Army division. The 1964 presidential election was still being decided and Johnson did not want commit too much On April 20, 1965, the US presence had grown to a distant war33,000 troops, with 20,000 more expected. Widening The increase of resources for the conflict was a gamble on many fronts and it Vietnam War was not a chance that Johnson was willing restricted to takemilitary personnel numbers. In addition to the effects escalating President Johnson requested an additional $700 million for the war would have on the electioneffort. Congress approved this request in only two days, Johnson was also concerned with how China demonstrating that US commitment to South Vietnam and the Soviet Union would react to more US involvementwar was still quite strong.

By 1965, with the election won and, however tenuous, a justification for increased military activity, Johnson approved ====Operation Rolling Thunder. It was a massive display of US firepower. Over the course of the next three and a half yearsDeepening Commitment====Before Johnson’s Johns Hopkins speech, the United States would drop over 100K pounds forces increased bombing of explosives on North VietnamVietnamese targets, devastating much of code-named Operation Rolling Thunder. The campaign had been in the planning stages before the infrastructure Gulf of the countryTonkin incident, but Johnson delayed such aggressive action. The preliminary targets were the factories manufacturing war materiel 1964 presidential election was still being decided, and other resources, like refineries, that allowed the North Vietnamese Johnson did not want to commit too much to make a distant war on their southern neighbor. The other, more psychological aim of Widening the operation was to crush the morale of the North Vietnamese. This effort conflict was a failure. Though the destruction brought gamble on by Rolling Thunder was costlymany fronts, and it made much of the population more resilient. The North Vietnamese knew they were no match for US air power, so they didn’t commit was not a great amount of resources chance that Johnson was willing to opposing ittake. Instead, the communist government devoted their energies to moving troops and supplies In addition to the south and defended against effects escalating the bombers as best they could. It was clear that war would have on the airstrikes were almost unstoppable. Howeverelection, when a bomber Johnson was shot down, what seemed to be against all odds, it provided also concerned with how China and the defenders of the North Vietnamese skies with a boost Soviet Union would react to their morale. They were never expected to stop the bombings so even the smallest challenger was seen as a victorymore US involvement.

As part, at least at first, of Operation Though the destruction brought on by Rolling Thunderwas costly, General William Westmoreland, the US commander it made much of US forces called for a greater presence in South Vietnam. In March of 1965 the United States Marine Corps took up positions in and around Da Nang Air Basepopulation more resilient. This was the first full scale deployment of The North Vietnamese knew they were no match for US ground forces in South Vietnam. The originalairpower, limited objective was so they didn’t commit many resources to secure the airfield in the region making oppose it available as a launching spot for . Instead, the sorties communist government devoted its energies to moving troops and supplies to the north. The area soon became one of south and defended against the main strongholds of the USMCbombers as best they could. Over It was clear that the course of 1965, multiple Marine air squadrons airstrikes were positioned in Da Nangalmost unstoppable. As the US presence grewHowever, when a bomber was shot down, what seemed to be against all odds, it also attracted provided the attention of North Vietnam and Vietnamese skies' defenders with a boost to their morale. They were never expected to stop the Viet Cong. In July of 1965bombings, so even the People’s Army of Vietnam and the Viet Cong attacked Da Nang Air Base, destroying multiple aircraftsmallest challenger was seen as a victory.

Military reversals for the Army At least at first, of Operation Rolling Thunder, General William Westmoreland, the Republic US commander of US forces, called for a greater presence in South Vietnam (ARVN) during May . In March of 1965, the United States Marine Corps took up positions in and June convinced General Westmoreland that even more American troops were needed to prevent a complete defeat around Da Nang Air Base. This was the first full-scale deployment of US ground forces in South Vietnam. Instead The original, limited objective was to secure the region's airfield, making it available as a launching spot for the north. The area soon became one of the 53main strongholds of the USMC. Throughout 1965, multiple Marine air squadrons were positioned in Da Nang. As the US presence grew,000 that was forecast for it also attracted the attention of North Vietnam and the rest Viet Cong. In July of 1965, Westmoreland requested the People’s Army of Vietnam and received an influx that would bring the US total to 117Viet Cong attacked Da Nang Air Base,000 by year’s enddestroying multiple aircraft.

By Military reversals for the summer Army of 1965, the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) during May and June convinced General Westmoreland was convinced that even more American troops were needed in Vietnam. In to prevent a meeting with Secretary complete defeat of Defense Robert McNamara, he believed 57 battalions were needed and additional helicopter and support unitsSouth Vietnam. Westmoreland also argued that, thus far the bombing Instead of the Ho Chi Minh Trail had so far proven to be ineffective and needed to be increased. When McNamara returned to Washington53, he brief the president on Westmoreland’s requests and subsequently added to the recommendations. McNamara proposed that 000 forecasts for the number rest of troops in Vietnam be increased to 1751965,000 Westmoreland requested and received an influx that would bring the National Guard and Reserve be activated. He also recommended increasing the bombing of North Vietnam from 2,500 missions a month US total to 4117,000 a monthby year’s end.

By the summer of 1965, Westmoreland was convinced that even more troops were needed in Vietnam. In a meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, he believed 57 battalions were needed and additional helicopter and support units. Westmoreland also argued that thus far, the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail had so far proven to be ineffective and needed to be increased. When McNamara returned to Washington, he briefed the president on Westmoreland’s requests and subsequently added the recommendations. McNamara proposed that the number of troops in Vietnam be increased to 175,000 and that the National Guard and Reserve be activated. He also recommended increasing the bombing of North Vietnam from 2,500 missions a month to 4,000 a month. President Johnson , for his part , continued to try and plot a gradual build -up in the war. He authorized an increase of troop strength to 125,000, not 175,000. He decided against activating the National Guard and Reserve, but doubled the number of men to be drafted per month from 17,000 to 35,000. With the build-up of troops, the United States was ready to launch its first large -scale offensive action of the war.

In an effort to <dh-ad/>To further secure the region, the marines Marines launched Operation Starlite in August of 1965. In order to prevent further attacks like the one on Da Nang in July, the The plan was sought to strike out with target a combined air and ground forceforces, supported by naval artillery, at an area where the Viet Cong were was suspected of concentrating. The plan was to make an amphibious landing near Van Tuong and push northward. In additionAlso, three landing zones were planned further west to surround surrounding the Viet Cong forces. After the multiple landings were executed, the marines were meant to push the Viet Cong into an exposed position where the naval fire power of the United States ' naval firepower could be brought to bear and destroy the opposition. Two significant factors are worth mentioning about the planning of Operation Starlite. First, this was going to be an “American Only” operation. Until this point, Americans were in a supporting role, if they were present at all. Second, and dovetailing with the first factor, was that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were was not informed of the operation.

The In the first part of the operation, the amphibious landing was met with little resistance. They were able to move into position with little difficulty. The other arm of the attack, was carried out in a manner which that would come to define the Vietnam War, helicopter deployment. Three companies of marines were delivered to three landing zones (LZ) code -named Red, White , and Blue. Before the marines Marines were deployed, artillery and aircraft pounded the LZ’s to insure ensure as little opposition as possible.

The aerial bombardment seemed to have worked as the first first helicopters dropped off their passengers with no incident. However, subsequent landings were met with much stiffer resistance. In a tactic already practiced, the Viet Cong allowed the first wave to land, only to open fire as more soldiers arrived, thus attacking a larger target. In order to To blunt this approach, American air support was called in to further bombard the Viet Cong positions, the most notable atop a hill, code -named Hill 43, which was just south of LZ Blue. Though the air strikes airstrikes were effective, they did not completely wholly dislodge the Viet Cong. The marines attacked the hill and eventually took it, reducing a substantial Viet Cong stronghold.

[[File:chu-lai-starlite.jpg|left|thumbnail|400px250px|Chu Lai Operation Starlite]]

The relative ease of the amphibious landing gave way to some of the heaviest fighting fightings of the battle. As the marines Marines were moving northward, they took fire from the village of An Cuong. The company commander was killed in the initial engagement, but the second in command was able to coordinate coordinated a successful attack on the Viet Cong position. During the battle , Corporal Robert E. O’Malley distinguished himself in the fighting and became the first marine to earn the Congressional Medal of Honor in Vietnam.

Perhaps the operation's heaviest fighting of the operation occurred when a support column got lost trying to find the company it was meant to aid. Instead , the resupply column was ambushed by the Viet Cong. Eventually , the company that was the intended destination, instead went to rescue their surprised compatriots. The marines took a number of several losses , and while they claimed significant damage to the enemy, it was hard to determine because of the system of bunkers and tunnels the Viet Cong used. The underground fortifications used by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were a constant difficulty for American forces to deal with through throughout the entire war.

In addition to learning more about the Viet Cong 's combat methods of combat, a number of several other lessons were taken from Operation Starlite. First, it was determined after the operation was over that the standard allotment of water, two gallons per day per soldier, was not enough in the oppressive Vietnamese heat. Second, the standard field rifle, the M-14 , was not conducive to fast deployment, specifically helicopter insertions. The soldiers on the ground found them too bulky. The search and development for a lighter, streamlined weapon became an important concern for the United States military. Finally, for the Viet Cong, it was an important battle as well. Though the overall tactically tactical philosophy of surprise and mobility was still paramount to the Viet Cong, they learned that even that was limited when fighting the American military. The amount of firepower the United States brought to any battlefield could make any ambush, like the one during Starlite, into a shooting gallery once American artillery gained its bearings.  ====Conclusion====The United States military considered Operation Starlite a success. A Viet Cong stronghold was reduced, many of the enemies were killed, and US losses were limited. However, as one US general noted, much of the Viet Cong force was able to retreat, did not lose any major weapons, and maintained the tactical advantage of surprise throughout the battle. In what would become a common refrain of the war, the US claimed victory, but the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese could fight another day. <youtube>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zAq6MrYgLr0</youtube>

[https://thevietnamwar.info/operation-rolling-thunder/ | Rolling Thunder]

[http://www.operationstarlite.com/history.html | Operation Starlite]