Changes

After the clash of US forces and North Vietnamese forces in the Gulf of Tonkin and the subsequent phantom attacks by the North Vietnamese on the USS Maddox and USS XXX, the United States Congress passed [official name] more commonly known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolutions which gave the president far greater latitude to coordinate and carry out military strikes without an official declaration of war. The United States and the Johnson administration put those new powers to use in 1965.

One of the themes, if not major theme, over the course of 1965 was the build up of American troops in South Vietnam. At the beginning of the year there were just over 23,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam. This number grew steadily over the year and until 1968, but each increase in troops, each strategic decision was often debated in the Johnson Administration. There was a decided tension between civilian leaders, military commanders in Washington and the military commanders in country.

That same month, some divisions within the US high command began to show. While Ambassador Taylor wanted more air strikes, he was wary of a greater amount of offensive operations. General Westmoreland, however, believed the US needed to become more aggressive. In a meeting that the ambassador did not attend, Westmoreland recommended two army brigades be brought into South Vietnam to secure more airfields but to also prepare an area near Saigon, the South Vietnamese capital, for entire US Army division. On April 20, 1965 the US presence had grown to 33,000 troops, with 20,000 more expected. The increase of resources for the Vietnam War wasn’t restricted to military personnel numbers. President Johnson requested an additional $700 million for the war effort. Congress approved this request in only two days, demonstrating that overall, US commitment to South Vietnam and the war was still quite strong.

Prior to Johnson’s Johns Hopkins speech the United States forces increased bombing of North Vietnamese targets, code named Operation Rolling Thunder. The campaign had been in the planning stages before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, but Johnson delayed such aggressive action. The 1964 presidential election was still being decided and Johnson did not want commit too much to a distant war. Widening the conflict was a gamble on many fronts and it was not a chance that Johnson was willing to take. In addition to the effects escalating the war would have on the election, Johnson was also concerned with how China and the Soviet Union would react to more US involvement.

President Johnson for his part continued to try and plot a gradual build up in the war. He authorized an increase of troop strength to 125,000, not 175,000. He decided against activating the National Guard and Reserve, but doubled the number of men to be drafted per month from 17,000 to 35,000. With the build-up of troops, the United States was ready to launch its first large scale offensive action of the war.

In an effort to further secure the region, the marines launched Operation Starlite in August of 1965. In order to prevent further attacks like the one on Da Nang in July, the plan was to strike out with a combined air and ground force, supported by naval artillery, at an area where Viet Cong were suspected of concentrating. The plan was to make an amphibious landing near Van Tuong and push northward. In addition, three landing zones were planned further west to surround the Viet Cong forces. After the multiple landings were executed, the marines meant to push the Viet Cong into an exposed position where the naval fire power of the United States could be brought to bear and destroy the opposition. Two significant factors are worth mentioning about the planning of Operation Starlite. First, this was going to be an “American Only” operation. Until this point, Americans were in a supporting role, if they were present at all. Second, and dovetailing with the first factor, was that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were not informed of the operation.

The United States military considered Operation Starlite a success. A Viet Cong stronghold was reduced, a large number of enemy were killed and US losses were limited. However as one US general noted, much of the Viet Cong force was able to retreat, did not lose any major weapons and were able to maintain the tactical advantage of surprise throughout the battle. In what would become a common refrain of the war, the US claimed victory, but the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were able to fight another day.

Anderson, David L., Editor. The Columbia History of the Vietnam War. New York, Columbia University Press, 2011.