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What was Blitzkrieg and Who Created it

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[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1981-070-15, Frankreich, Panzer IV.jpg|300px|left|thumbnail|Panzer IV in France 1940]]
During World War Two, Germany used Blitzkrieg warfare or "Lightning War" to quickly sweep through Europe. Poland, Norway, France, the Low Countries, the Balkans, North Africa, and the Soviet Union were quickly overwhelmed, and Germany's victories were incredibly fast and efficient. France's famed Maginot Line proved utterly useless in the face of Germany's German forces new approach to mechanized warfare.
Remarkably, instead of inventing a new type form of warfare, Hans von Seeckt (Commander of the Reichswehr from 1920-1926) used traditional German/Prussia warfare tactics but updated them for armored/mechanized infantry and airpower to create Blitzkrieg. Hans von Seeckt was both the architect of the German Wehrmacht and Blitzkrieg tactics used so successfully in World War Two. These victories were so stunning that they gave rise to the myth of German military supremacy—a myth that has persisted to this day.
==How is Blitzkrieg or "Lightning War" defined?==
Mechanization was relatively slow to come to the German army, in part because of the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and because of simple poverty. Von Seeckt himself was a traditionalist and believed that exploitation of a breakthrough was a task for cavalry. Like most other militaries, the Reichswehr initially conceived of tanks as infantry support weapons—which was logical given the unreliability, slow speed, and short operational range of early tanks.<ref>Richard Ogorkiewicz, Armored Forces. New York: Acro Publishing Company. 1970, p. 13.</ref>
Improvements in armor technology changed German minds, however. By the late ‘20s, the idea of giving armor primacy on the battlefield was beginning to take hold in the Reichswehr. Instead of subordinating tanks to infantry, and thereby limiting their tactical and operational speed, thought was given to finding ways to subordinate the other arms to tanks instead.<ref>For a detailed account of the German military’s forces’ interwar development see Mary R. Habeck, ''Storm of Steel''. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003; Robert Citino, ''The Path to Blitzkrieg''. USA: Lynne Rinnier Publishers, Inc, 1999.</ref>
The development of armor in Germany has long been associated with Heinz Guderian, who claimed to be the “father” of the panzers in his autobiography Achtung Panzer! Guderian was indeed an essential figure in the history of the panzer forces, but he exaggerated his role. And while there was some resistance to the use of armor in the Reichswehr, it was not as marked as he claimed. Many other commanders and theorists had a more direct role than Guderian: men like Ludwig Beck, Oswald Lutz, Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger, and Ernst Volckheim, among others. The German military establishment had already agreed to use tanks as their main striking force before Guderian became involved in the panzerwaffe’s growth.<ref>Dennis Showalter, ''Hitler’s Panzers''. USA: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2009, pp. 22-70.</ref>
Hitler was himself a believer in Douhet-ian ideas of the utility of the terror brought about by bombing civilians, even if it is unclear whether he had ever read Douhet. Throughout the war, he would advocate retaliation as a means of deterring strategic bombing on the Reich. This obsession would lead to technological and economic diversions such as the V-1 flying bomb and V-2 rocket.
However, it was once again Germany’s central position which that dictated strategy. Since the country faced the prospect of immediate invasion from any number of neighbors, it always had to use its air force in conjunction with its ground forces. At the very least, it had to secure German airspace, and the Luftwaffe could certainly not afford to engage in strategic bombing to the detriment of other military requirements:
Thus it would scarcely improve Germany’s strategic position if-- at the same time that the Luftwaffe launched aerial attacks on London, Paris, and Warsaw-- Germany’s enemies defeated the Wehrmacht on the border and overran Silesia, East Prussia, and the Rhineland.<ref>Murray, Strategy for Defeat, p. 1.</ref>
==Conclusion==
It must finally be mentioned that political and social factors come into play as well. The German armed forces were united with the Nazis German leadership to rebuild military power and embark on wars to restore German position. This position was widely accepted, and unlike countries like France or Britain, Germans were not anti-war.
The German desire for revenge for Versailles' slights and her perceived humiliation combined with her armed forces doctrine of warfare. The result was an ability to engage in aggressive combat that was far more balanced and studied than Germany’s prospective opponents. The years of preparation also stood the Germans in good stead, and the Wehrmacht was generally better trained, had better procedures, and had far better integrated its equipment than its opponents.

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