15,697
edits
Changes
no edit summary
Then there was the western allies' continued underestimation of the Turks. The Ottomans had been heavily defeated in many Balkan Wars, and it was assumed that they would flee at the sight of the superior western navies and armies. A sense of western superiority meant that the Allies failed to recognize the capabilities of the Turks.<ref> Erickson, Edward "Strength Against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915." <i>The Journal of Military History</i> 65: 981–1012</ref>
b====Conclusion====
[[File: Gallipoli 3.jpg|thumbnail|250px|left|Ottoman Machine gun]]
The Gallipoli campaign was doomed from the start. Too few soldiers were allocated to the landings. To compound this, the Allied intelligence services failed to provide adequate intelligence. For example, they failed to indicate that Gallipoli, was not suitable, for large scale landings because of the nature of the terrain. Then the entire operation was poorly planned with little forethought from logistics or what the allies would do if the Turks were waiting for the invaders at the proposed beachheads. Then there There was also a complete failure to recognize that the Turks would fiercely fight fiercely because they were fighting for protecting their homeland, this . This is symbolized by the great excellent leadership displayed by the future Ataturk at Sulva Bay and elsewhere. The German commander at Gallipoli also devised a clever smart strategy , but he was greatly helped by the failings of the alliesmuch helped him.
<div class="portal" style="width:85%;">
