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The Allies were stunned by the failure of the Gallipoli operation. It led to the resignation of Winston Churchill and almost the end of his political career. The campaign was poorly planned and even under-resourced. The commander at Gallipoli, Hamilton, had only five divisions , and they had had very little time to train together , and this led to a dangerous degree of confusion. These problems reduced the likelihood of success at Gallipoli.<ref> Keegan, p. 215</ref> It is normally believed that an attack force had to have a clear superiority in numbers , and this was not the case at Gallipoli. Then there was the issue of geography and terrain. The terrain was such that it slowed down the landings and the Allies subsequent attempts to advance inland. This is indicated in the observations of many Australian officers who frequently ‘complained about the choice of the battlefield.’<ref> Bean, Charles. "The Story of ANZAC from the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915." <i>Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 I</i> (11th ed.) (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1941), p. 67, 89</ref> There were also severe logistical problems and they were not resolved until much later in the campaign, with the recruitment of porters and workmen from Malta and Egypt.

The terrain was such that it slowed down the landings and the Allies' subsequent attempts to advance inland. This problem is indicated in the observations of many Australian officers who frequently 'complained about the choice of the battlefield.' <ref> Bean, Charles. "The Story of ANZAC from the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915." <i>Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 I</i> (11th ed.) (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1941), p. 67, 89</ref> There were also severe logistical problems and them were not resolved until much later in the campaign, with the recruitment of porters and workers from Malta and Egypt.  The Allies had failed to anticipate that the Turks would be able to fire on them when they were landing , and this meant that they did not seize their objectives early on during the campaign. Then there was the strategy adopted by Sanders, he refused to adopt take a rigid system of defence defense and instead stressed mobility. He split his forces into three groups in order to quickly respond to any landingquickly.  Sanders then recommended that the Turkish forces built defences defenses on the heights surrounding the allied beachheads , and this meant that the allies could not break advance inland. However, if the German had listened to Colonel Kemal, (later Ataturk) who commanded the 19th Division, the allies could have been decimated. The future founder of Modern Turkey had predicted the exact areas where the allies would land.  Another factor in the failure of the Allies at Gallipoli was a lack of good intelligence. More than one Allied commander complained that they were unsure of what the ‘situation 'situation was on the ground.’' <ref> Bean, p. 119</ref> The allies did have one chance to grasp some advantage from the Gallipoli landings , and that was at Sulva Bay, if the Generals had been more aggressive, they could have altered the battle in their favourfavor.  Then there were was the western allies ' continued underestimation of the Turks. The Ottomans had been heavily defeated in many Balkan Wars , and it was assumed that they would flee at the sight of the superior western navies and armies. A sense of western superiority meant that the Allies failed to recognize the capabilities of the Turks.<ref> Erickson, Edward "Strength Against Weakness: Ottoman Military Effectiveness at Gallipoli, 1915." <i>The Journal of Military History</i> 65: 981–1012</ref>