15,697
edits
Changes
no edit summary
[[File:operation-rolling-thunder.jpg|thumbnail|left|400px|Operation Rolling Thunder]]__NOTOC__
After the clash of US forces and North Vietnamese forces in the Gulf of Tonkin and the subsequent phantom attacks by the North Vietnamese on the USS Maddox and USS XXX, the United States Congress passed [official name] more commonly known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolutions which . The Resolutions gave the president far greater latitude to coordinate and carry out military strikes without an official declaration of war. The United States and the Johnson administration put those new powers to use in 1965.
====Troop Build Up and Early Dissent====One of the themes, if not the major theme, throughout 1965 was the build-up of American troops in South Vietnam. At the beginning of the year, there was just over 23,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam. This number grew steadily over the year and until 1968, but each increase in troops, each strategic decision was often debated in the Johnson Administration. There was a decided tension between civilian leaders, military commanders in Washington and the military commanders in the country.
In April of 1965, President Johnson delivered a pivotal speech at Johns Hopkins University. The president outlined for the first time a possible path to peace by negotiating with the North Vietnamese. In essence, Johnson declared that the US was open to discussions of a peaceful solution, but did not offer any real specifics. He did propose, in addition to continued military assistance to the south, a program in the Mekong River area, in both the north and south, of rigorous modernization of the region. He compared it the the Tennessee Valley Authority of a generation before during the New Deal. The North Vietnamese bluntly stated that no negotiations would take place as long as the US military was still in the south.
That same month, some divisions within the US high command began to show. While Ambassador Taylor wanted more air strikes, he was wary of a greater amount of offensive operations. General Westmoreland, however, believed the US needed to become more aggressive. In a meeting that the ambassador did not attend, Westmoreland recommended two army brigades be brought into South Vietnam to secure more airfields but to also prepare an area near Saigon, the South Vietnamese capital, for entire US Army division. On April 20, 1965 , the US presence had grown to 33,000 troops, with 20,000 more expected. The increase of resources for the Vietnam War wasn’t was not restricted to military personnel numbers. President Johnson requested an additional $700 million for the war effort. Congress approved this request in only two days, demonstrating that overall, US commitment to South Vietnam and the war was still quite strong.
====Operation Rolling Thunder and Deepening Commitment====Before Johnson’s Johns Hopkins speech the United States forces increased bombing of North Vietnamese targets, code-named Operation Rolling Thunder. The campaign had been in the planning stages before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, but Johnson delayed such aggressive action. The 1964 presidential election was still being decided, and Johnson did not want to commit too much to a distant war. Widening the conflict was a gamble on many fronts, and it was not a chance that Johnson was willing to take. In addition to the effects escalating the war would have on the election, Johnson was also concerned with how China and the Soviet Union would react to more US involvement.
As part, at least at first, of Operation Rolling Thunder, General William Westmoreland, the US commander of US forces called for a greater presence in South Vietnam. In March of 1965 , the United States Marine Corps took up positions in and around Da Nang Air Base. This was the first full -scale deployment of US ground forces in South Vietnam. The original, limited objective was to secure the airfield in the region making it available as a launching spot for the sorties to the north. The area soon became one of the main strongholds of the USMC. Over the course of Throughout 1965, multiple Marine air squadrons were positioned in Da Nang. As the US presence grew, it also attracted the attention of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. In July of 1965, the People’s Army of Vietnam and the Viet Cong attacked Da Nang Air Base, destroying multiple aircraft.
Military reversals for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) during May and June convinced General Westmoreland that even more American troops were needed to prevent a complete defeat of South Vietnam. Instead of the 53,000 that was forecast for the rest of 1965, Westmoreland requested and received an influx that would bring the US total to 117,000 by year’s end.
By the summer of 1965, Westmoreland was convinced that even more troops were needed in Vietnam. In a meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, he believed 57 battalions were needed and additional helicopter and support units. Westmoreland also argued that, thus far the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail had so far proven to be ineffective and needed to be increased. When McNamara returned to Washington, he brief briefed the president on Westmoreland’s requests and subsequently added to the recommendations. McNamara proposed that the number of troops in Vietnam be increased to 175,000 and that the National Guard and Reserve be activated. He also recommended increasing the bombing of North Vietnam from 2,500 missions a month to 4,000 a month.
President Johnson for his part continued to try and plot a gradual build -up in the war. He authorized an increase of troop strength to 125,000, not 175,000. He decided against activating the National Guard and Reserve, but doubled the number of men to be drafted per month from 17,000 to 35,000. With the build-up of troops, the United States was ready to launch its first large scale offensive action of the war.
====Operation Starlite====<dh-ad/>To further secure the region, the Marines launched Operation Starlite in August of 1965. The plan sought to target with a combined air and ground force, supported by naval artillery, an area where Viet Cong was suspected of concentrating. The plan was to make an amphibious landing near Van Tuong and push northward. Also, three landing zones were planned further west to surrounding the Viet Cong forces. After the multiple landings were executed, the marines meant to push the Viet Cong into an exposed position where the naval fire power of the United States could be brought to bear and destroy the opposition. Two significant factors are worth mentioning about the planning of Operation Starlite. First, this was going to be an “American Only” operation. Until this point, Americans were in a supporting role, if they were present at all. Second, and dovetailing with the first factor, was that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were not informed of the operation.
The aerial bombardment seemed to have worked as the first part of the operationhelicopters dropped off their passengers with no incident. However, the amphibious landing was subsequent landings were met with little much stiffer resistance. They were able In a tactic already practiced, the Viet Cong allowed the first wave to land, only to move into position with little difficultyopen fire as more soldiers arrived, thus attacking a larger target. The other arm of the attackTo blunt this approach, American air support was carried out called in a manner which would come to define bombard the Vietnam WarViet Cong positions further, the most notable atop a hill, helicopter deployment. Three companies of marines were delivered to three landing zones (LZ) code -named RedHill 43, White and which was just south of LZ Blue. Before Though the marines air strikes were deployedeffective, artillery they did not wholly dislodge the Viet Cong. The marines attacked the hill and aircraft pounded the LZ’s to insure as little opposition as possibleeventually took it, reducing a substantial Viet Cong stronghold.
In addition to learning more about the Viet Cong methods of combat, a number of other lessons were taken from Operation Starlite. First, it was determined after the operation was over that the standard allotment of water, two gallons per day per soldier, was not enough in the oppressive Vietnamese heat. Second, the standard field rifle, the M-14 was not conducive to fast deployment, specifically helicopter insertions. The soldiers on the ground found them too bulky. The search and development for a lighter, streamlined weapon became an important concern for the United States military. Finally, for the Viet Cong, it was an important battle as well. Though the overall tactically philosophy of surprise and mobility was still paramount to the Viet Cong, they learned that even that was limited when fighting the American military. The amount of firepower the United States brought to any battlefield could make any ambush, like the one during Starlite, into a shooting gallery once American artillery gained its bearings.
The United States military considered Operation Starlite a success. A Viet Cong stronghold was reduced, a large number of enemy were killed , and US losses were limited. However as one US general noted, much of the Viet Cong force was able to retreat, did not lose any major weapons and were able to maintain the tactical advantage of surprise throughout the battle. In what would become a common refrain of the war, the US claimed victory, but the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were able to fight another day. ===References===
====References====
Anderson, David L., Editor. The Columbia History of the Vietnam War. New York, Columbia University Press, 2011.
http://www.operationstarlite.com/history.html Operation Starlite
[[Category:United States History]] [[Category:Wikis]] [[Category:Vietnam War]] [[Category:Military History]] [[Category:20th Century History]] [[Category:Vietnam History]]