Changes

At the end of December 1979, the Soviet Union sent thousands of troops into Afghanistan and immediately assumed complete military and political control of Kabul and large portions of the country. This event began a brutal, decade-long attempt by Moscow to subdue the Afghan civil war and maintain a friendly and socialist government on its border. It was a watershed event of the Cold War, marking the only time the Soviet Union invaded a country outside the Eastern Bloc—a strategic decision met by nearly worldwide condemnation. While the massive, lightning-fast military maneuvers and brazenness of Soviet political objectives constituted an “invasion” of Afghanistan, the word “intervention” more accurately describes these events as the culmination of growing Soviet domination going back to 1973. Undoubtedly, leaders in the Kremlin had hoped that a rapid and complete military takeover would secure Afghanistan’s place as an exemplar of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which held that once a country became socialist Moscow would never permit it to return to the capitalist camp. The United States and its European allies, guided by their own doctrine of containment, sharply criticized the Soviet move into Afghanistan and devised numerous measures to compel Moscow to withdraw[[File:JimmyCarterPortrait2.jpg|left|thumbnail|250px|President Jimmy Carter]]

In At the summer end of 1973, Mohammed DaoudDecember 1979, the former Afghan Prime Minister, launched a successful coup against King Zahir. Although Daoud himself was more nationalist than socialist, his coup was dependent on pro-Soviet Union sent thousands of troops into Afghanistan and immediately assumed complete military and political factions. Since 1955 Moscow had provided military training control of Kabul and materiel to Afghanistan; by 1973, a third large portions of active troops had trained on Soviet soilthe country. AdditionallyThis event began a brutal, Daoud enjoyed decade-long attempt by Moscow to subdue the support of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded in 1965 upon Marxist ideology Afghan civil war and allegiance to Moscow. In 1967 the PDPA split into two factions: the Parchamists, led by Babrak Karmal (who supported Daoud), maintain a friendly and the “Khalqis” led by Noor Tarakisocialist government on its border. For It was a watershed event of the next five yearsCold War, Daoud attempted marking the impossible task of governing Afganistan’s Islamic tribal regions, while also struggling to reconcile only time the PDPA split. But the more radical Khalq faction never fully recognized Daoud’s leadership, while Karmal viewed Soviet Union invaded a country outside the coup largely as a means to consolidate his own power. In response, Daoud hoped to mitigate both of these threats Eastern Bloc—a strategic decision met by steering Afghanistan away from Soviet influence and improving U.S. relations, while decreasing the influence of radical elements in the government and militarynearly worldwide condemnation.

Daoud’s middle course ended in disaster. On April 28, 1978, soldiers aligned with Taraki’s “Khalq” faction assaulted ====Why did the USSR Invade?====While the presidential palacemassive, where troops executed Daoud lightning-fast military maneuvers and his family. In brazenness of Soviet political objectives constituted an “invasion” of Afghanistan, the following days Taraki became word “intervention” more accurately describes these events as the Prime Ministerculmination of growing Soviet domination going back to 1973. Undoubtedly, the Kremlin leaders had hoped that a rapid and, in complete military takeover would secure Afghanistan’s place as an attempt to end exemplar of the PDPA’s divisionsBrezhnev Doctrine, Karmal which held that once a country became Deputy Prime Minister. In Washingtonsocialist, this Communist revolution was met with alarm. The Carter administration recognized that Taraki Moscow would undo Daoud’s attempt never permit it to steer Afghanistan away from Moscow, and it debated whether return to cut ties with Afghanistan or recognize Taraki in the hopes that Soviet influence could be containedcapitalist camp. Although the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated the former courseThe United States and its European allies, Carter supported the Department of State’s advocacy of recognition. Shortly after the revolutionguided by their own containment doctrine, Washington recognized sharply criticized the new government Soviet move into Afghanistan and soon named Adolph Dubs its Ambassador devised numerous measures to compel Moscow to Afghanistan. Until his kidnapping and death at the hands of Afghan Shia dissidents in February 1979, Dubs strongly pursued good relations with the Taraki regime in the hopes that U.S. support would keep Soviet influence at baywithdraw.

Once again, ====What events led up to the tumult of internal Afghan politics complicated both U.S. and Soviet jockeying. Invasion?====In the summer of 19791973, Hafizullah AminMohammed Daoud, a longtime ally of Taraki who became Deputy the former Afghan Prime Minister following the April Revolution, received word that Babrak Karmal (Daoud’s early supporter) was leading launched a Parcham plot to overthrow the Taraki regimesuccessful coup against King Zahir. Amin took the opportunity to purge and execute many Parchamists and consolidate Although Daoud was more nationalist than socialist, his own power. Complicating matters further, this internal strife damaged the Kabul Government’s major national program, namely, to bring the Communist revolution to the Islamic tribal areas beyond Kabul. By the winter of 1978, this program coup was met by armed revolt throughout the country. In response, Amin and Taraki traveled to Moscow to sign a friendship treaty which included a provision that would allow direct dependent on pro-Soviet military assistance should the Islamic insurgency threaten the regime. This insurrection intensified over the next year and it became increasingly obvious to the Soviets that Taraki could not prevent all-out civil war and the prospect of a hostile Islamic government taking controlpolitical factions. By mid-1979 Since 1955 Moscow was searching had provided military training and materiel to replace Taraki and AminAfghanistan; by 1973, and dispatched combat a third of active troops to Bagram Air Base outside of Kabul. This move prompted the Carter administration to begin supplying non-lethal aid to Afghan mujahedeen, or Islamic insurgentshad trained on Soviet soil. In AugustAdditionally, a high-ranking Soviet military delegation arrived in Kabul to assess Daoud enjoyed the situation. U.S. officials interpreted this mission as one last Soviet attempt to shore up support of the Taraki regimePeople’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded in 1965 upon Marxist ideology and also an opportunity allegiance to devise a military takeover. Regarding the latter, most analysts in Washington believed that such a move remained possible but unlikelyMoscow.

But this calculus was bound to change. Amin sensed In 1967 the PDPA split into two factions: the Soviet mission was designed to strengthen Taraki at his expense. In responseParchamists, led by Babrak Karmal (who supported Daoud), forces loyal to Amin executed and the “Khalqis” led by Noor Taraki in October—a move that infuriated Moscow, which began amassing combat units along its border. At this juncture Washington was still unsure how to interpret For the Soviet maneuvers: was next five years, Daoud attempted the Soviet Union planning a full takeover or did it remain committed impossible task of governing Afganistan’s Islamic tribal regions while also struggling to preserving the April Revolution? Analysts remained skeptical that Moscow would occupy the country given reconcile the political and economic costsPDPA split. By But the winter of 1979, faced with mutinies and an uncertain more radical Khalq faction never fully recognized Daoud’s leadership, while Karmal viewed the Afghan Army was unable coup largely as a means to provide basic security consolidate his own power. In response, Daoud hoped to the government against the onslaught mitigate both of Islamic fighters nearing Kabul. By that point the Soviets were sending in motorized divisions these threats by steering Afghanistan away from Soviet influence and Special Forcesimproving U. Washington demanded an explanation, which the Soviets ignoredS. Finally, on Christmas Eve, relations while decreasing the invasion began. Soviet troops killed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as influence of radical elements in the Soviet’s puppet head of governmentand military.

Although the Carter administration had closely watched this buildup from the outset====Daoud murdered and Soviet ally installed?==== Daoud’s middle course ended in disaster. On April 28, its reaction following the invasion revealed that1978, until soldiers aligned with Taraki’s “Khalq” faction assaulted the endpresidential palace, it clung to where troops executed Daoud and his family. In the hope that the Soviets would not invadefollowing days, based on Taraki became the unjustified assumption that Moscow would conclude that the costs of invasion were too highprime minister. In response, Carter wrote a sharply-worded letter an attempt to Brezhnev denouncing Soviet aggression, and during his State of the Union address he announced his own doctrine vowing to protect Middle Eastern oil supplies from encroaching Soviet power. The administration also enacted economic sanctions and trade embargoes against end the Soviet UnionPDPA’s divisions, called for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and stepped up its aid to the Afghan insurgentsKarmal became Deputy Prime Minister. In sumWashington, these actions were Washington’s collective this Communist revolution was met with alarm. The Carter administration recognized that Taraki would undo Daoud’s attempt to make the Soviets’ “adventure” in steer Afghanistan as painful and brief as possible. Instead, it took ten years of grinding insurgency before away from Moscow finally withdrew, at the cost of millions of lives and billions of dollars. In their wake, the Soviets left a shattered country It debated whether to cut ties with Afghanistan or recognize Taraki in which the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist group, seized control, later providing Osama bin Laden with a training base from which to launch terrorist operations worldwidehopes that Soviet influence could be contained.

Although the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated the former course, Carter supported the Department of State’s advocacy of recognition. Shortly after the revolution, Washington recognized the new government and soon named Adolph Dubs its Ambassador to Afghanistan. Until his kidnapping and death at the hands of Afghan Shia dissidents in February 1979, Dubs strongly pursued good relations with the Taraki regime in the hopes that U.S. support would keep Soviet influence at bay. Once again, the tumult of internal Afghan politics complicated both U.S. and Soviet jockeying. In the summer of 1979, Hafizullah Amin, a longtime ally of Taraki who became Deputy Prime Minister following the April Revolution, received word that Babrak Karmal (Daoud’s early supporter) was leading a Parcham plot to overthrow the Taraki regime. Amin took the opportunity to purge and execute many Parchamists and consolidate his own power. Complicating matters further, this internal strife damaged the Kabul Government’s major national program, namely, to bring the Communist revolution to the Islamic tribal areas beyond Kabul.  ====Political Choas led to armed revolt throughout the Afghanistan====By the winter of 1978, this program was met by armed revolt throughout the country. In response, Amin and Taraki traveled to Moscow to sign a friendship treaty, which included a provision that would allow direct Soviet military assistance should the Islamic insurgency threaten the regime. This insurrection intensified over the next year. It became increasingly obvious to the Soviets that Taraki could not prevent all-out civil war and a hostile Islamic government's prospect of taking control.  By mid-1979, Moscow searched to replace Taraki and Amin and dispatched combat troops to Bagram Air Base outside of Kabul. This move prompted the Carter administration to begin supplying non-lethal aid to Afghan mujahedeen, or Islamic insurgents. In August, a high-ranking Soviet military delegation arrived in Kabul to assess the situation. U.S. officials interpreted this mission as one last Soviet attempt to shore up the Taraki regime and an opportunity to devise a military takeover. Regarding the latter, most analysts in Washington believed that such a move remained possible but unlikely. But this calculus was bound to change. Amin sensed the Soviet mission was designed to strengthen Taraki at his expense. In response, Amin's forces executed Taraki in October—a move that infuriated Moscow, which began amassing combat units along its border. At this juncture, Washington was still unsure how to interpret the Soviet maneuvers: was the Soviet Union planning a full takeover, or did it remain committed to preserving the April Revolution? Analysts remained skeptical that Moscow would occupy the country, given the political and economic costs.  By the winter of 1979, faced with mutinies and an uncertain leadership, the Afghan Army could not provide basic security to the government against the onslaught of Islamic fighters nearing Kabul. By that point, the Soviets were sending in motorized divisions and Special Forces. Washington demanded an explanation, which the Soviets ignored. Finally, on Christmas Eve, the invasion began. Soviet troops killed Amin and installed Babrak Karmal as the Soviet’s puppet head of government. ====President's Carter Reaction to the Soviet Invasion====Although the Carter administration had closely watched this buildup from the outset, its reaction following the invasion revealed that, until the end, it clung to the hope that the Soviets would not invade, based on the unjustified assumption that Moscow would conclude that the costs of the invasion were too high. In response, Carter wrote a sharply-worded letter to Brezhnev denouncing Soviet aggression. During his State of the Union address, he announced his own doctrine to protect Middle Eastern oil supplies from encroaching Soviet power.  The administration also enacted economic sanctions and trade embargoes against the Soviet Union, called for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and stepped up its aid to the Afghan insurgents. In sum, these actions were Washington’s collective attempt to make the Soviets’ “adventure” in Afghanistan as painful and brief as possible. Instead, it took ten years of grinding insurgency before Moscow finally withdrew, at the cost of millions of lives and billions of dollars. In their wake, the Soviets left a shattered country where the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist group, seized control, later providing Osama bin Laden with a training base from which to launch terrorist operations worldwide. <youtube>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NtEukT0VKHE</youtube> * Republished from [https://history.state.gov/| Office of the Historian, United States Department of State]* Article: [https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan| The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978–1980] [[Category:Russian History]] [[Category:United States History]] [[Category:Cold War]] [[Category:20th Century History]]